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INTRODUCTION
On January 10, 2000, Internet giant America Online, Inc. ("AOL")
agreed to purchase media conglomerate Time Warner Inc. in a record
setting one-hundred and sixty-five billion dollar deal.' The merger
represents the next generation media company, combining "new"
and "old" companies into one.2 Time Warner's print publications,
cable television lines, and services complement AOL's online and
3
interactive services.
Prior to finalizing AOL's acquisition of Time Warner, the merger
required approval from several regulatory agencies.' In the United
States, the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"),5 and the Federal Communication Commission
1. See Saul Hansell, Media Megadeal: The Overview; :hnerica Online Agrees
to Buy Time Warnerfor $165 Billion: Media Deal is Richest Merger, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2000, at Al (announcing the proposed merger and terms of the deal); see
also Patrick McGeehan, Media Megadeal: The Value: By Any Measure, a Big
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at C6 (indicating that most newspapers valued
the deal differently, with figures as low as roughly one-hundred and fifty-six
billion dollars (the Wall Street Journal) to three-hundred and thirty-five billion
dollars (the Financial Times)). When the deal closed on January 12, 2001, the
value of the deal had declined to one hundred and twelve billion dollars due to a
decline in the stock price of AOL. See Alec Klein, FCC Clears IVaoJr AOL Time
Warner Inc., WASH. POST, Jan. 12. 2001, at AI (declaring the final value of the
deal to be S112 billion, second largest in value behind the proposed Sprint/MCI
World Corn deal).
2. See Martin Peers et al., Media Blitz: AOL. Time Wlarner Leap Borders to
Plan a Mammoth Merger, WALL ST. J.. Jan. 11. 2000, at Al (discussing the
merger between old-media Time Warner and new-media AOL, and how the
combined company plans to become the standard of the next generation media
business); see also Thomas J. D'Amico & Gabriela i. Coman, Eve on Washington,
4 E-COM. L. REP. 19, 19 (2000) (conjecturing that the terms "'old media" and 'new
media" no longer accurately describe the state of the media scene).
3. See generally David Lieberman. Merger Fulfills Needs of Each
'Opportunity' Now AOL Time Warner, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2000, at BI
(analyzing the products and services each company brings to the merger).
4. See Julia Malone, Regulatory Approval: Process Will Take Time, but Few
Hurdles Seen, ATLANTrA J. & CONST., Jan. 11, 2000. at 4F (discussing the
regulatory review processes the proposed merger will undergo).
5. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C.A. §
18(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (setting forth the requirements for pre-merger
notification and request for approval to the Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, and the Federal Trade Commission).
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("FCC")6 had the authority to review the proposed merger, although
only the FTC and FCC conducted in-depth reviews. 7 The European
Union's Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of
the European Communities ("Competition Commission")8 also
evaluated the proposed AOL/Time Warner merger; its evaluation
was similar to the review conducted by the FTC.' On October 11,
2000, the Competition Commission approved the merger, with
conditions. 0 The FTC approved the merger on December 14, 2000,11
and the merger was finalized on January 12, 2001 upon approval of
6. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 310 (1994 & Supp. III
1997) (establishing the procedures necessary to apply for approval from the FCC'
for a transfer of licenses).
7. See Malone, supra note 4, at 4F (discussing the fact that only one of the
agencies would make the final determination as to whether the proposed merger
was violative of antitrust laws); see also Letter from To-Quyen Truong, Associate
Chief, Cable Services Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, to Arthur 11.
Harding, Esq. and Peter D. Ross, Esq., attorneys for AOL and Time Warner (June
9, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/csb/aoltw/infol.txt (requesting the first
of several expected series of documents to assist the FCC in its review of the
proposed merger).

8. See VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION
LAW AND PRACTICE 18 (6th ed. 1997) (explaining why the Competition
Commission used to be known as the DG IV). The European Commission is
divided up into twenty directorate generals ("DGs"), each responsible for a
different policy. Id. The Competition Commission was the fourth directorate
general established, hence the name DG IV, or fourth Directorate General. d.
9. See Malone, supra note 4, at 4F (characterizing the FCC's role as
determining whether the merger would have public utility). See generally MORTIEN
P. BROBERG, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S JURISDICTION TO SCRUTINISI,
MERGERS (1998) (providing an overview of the Competition Commission and the
sources of law that confer its power to regulate mergers and acquisitions).
10. See Press Release, Commission Gives Conditional Approval to AOL/Time
Warner Merger (Oct. 11, 2000) (announcing the Competition Commission's
approval and outlining the conditions placed upon approval), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=l P00/I 14
5101AGED&lg=EN. Some of the conditions include AOL severing its relationship
with Bertelsmann AG, AOL transacting with Bertelsmann AG at an arm's length
until the relationship is severed, and ensuring that Bertelsmann AG's music is
neither made available exclusively over AOL's Internet Service Provider ("ISP"),
nor is it formatted in a proprietary manner playable only by AOL's Winamp online
music player. Id.
11. See Frank James, AOL, Time Warner Win FTCs OK for Merger, CIII.
TRIB., Dec. 15, 2000, at I (announcing the FTC's approval and conditions for
approval of the merger).
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the FCC. 12

The review process undertaken by the FCC, FTC, and
Competition Commission begins with a determination of the type of
merger the union between AOL and Time Warner represents, as the
type of merger affects the level of scrutiny.' 3 Strictly speaking, the
AOL/Time Warner combination is neither a horizontal " nor a
vertical 5 merger. A merger that is neither horizontal nor vertical falls
within a category that is a catch-all for all other types of mergers - a
conglomerate merger. 6 There are several types of conglomerate
mergers, including a product-extension merger. 7 The union of AOL
12. See Christopher Grimes, AOL Tine W1'arner Joins NYSE Trading Media
FCC Finally Approves Dollars 106bn Deal, with Only "Minor' Restrictions on
AOL's Instant Messaging Sen'ice, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at 20 (describing the
newly formed company after the proposed merger received the final regulatory
approval).
13. See John W. Berresford, Mergers in Mobile Telecommunications Services:
A Primer on the Analysis of their Competitive Effects, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 247,
280 (1996) (distinguishing between horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate
mergers).
14. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 56
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (discussing what constitutes a horizontal merger); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a horizontal merger as
"[a] merger between two or more businesses that are on the same market level
because they manufacture similar products in the same geographic region; a
merger of direct competitors."). See generally 27 WORDS AND PHRASES, "Merger"
179 (1961 & Supp. 2000) (providing a detailed explanation of mergers).
15. See General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. at 56 (discussing what
constitutes a vertical merger); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (7th ed.
1999) (defining a vertical merger as "[a] merger between businesses occupying
different levels of operation for the same product, such as between a manufacturer
and a retailer; a merger of buyer and seller.").
16. See General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. at 56 (discussing what
constitutes a conglomerate merger); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (7th
ed. 1999) (defining a conglomerate merger as a merger between businesses that are
neither direct competitors - a horizontal merger - nor buyers and sellers - a
vertical merger); Comment, Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1265 (1962-63) (analyzing the make-up and
characteristics of conglomerate mergers).
17. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577-78 (1967)
(establishing the standard of a product-extension merger and its effect on anticompetitive behavior); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining a product-extension merger as -[a] merger in which the products of the
acquired company are complementary to those of the acquiring company and may
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and Time Warner, however, is not a product-extension merger since
their products are on two different markets and media outlets. Once
the regulatory agency determines the type of merger, it can then
begin the review process.
The problem of identifying the merger category manifests itself in
the antitrust review process, as the type of merger affects the extent
and analysis of the review process." Horizontal mergers receive
stricter scrutiny than vertical or conglomerate mergers due to the
potential for monopolistic and anti-consumer behavior by the merged
company. 20 The advances of technology also alter the way one
regards

companies'

business

and markets.2 '

The Competition

Commission had to tackle and resolve these issues during its review
process. Trying to apply traditional merger classifications to the
AOL/Time Warner deal exposes the problem of laws and regulations
not adapting quickly enough to cope with rapid technological
advances.22
be produced with similar facilities, marketed through the same channels, and
advertised by the same media.").
18. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining how AOL and Time
Warner's products do not compete within the same markets).
19. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, The Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division,
Merger
Enforcement,
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz book/hmgl.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines] (providing guidelines for
evaluating horizontal mergers); Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, The
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Merger Enforcement (providing
guidelines for evaluating all mergers except horizontal ones), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2001).
20. See Berresford, supra note 13, at 281-82 (discussing how the classification
of merger effects the level of scrutiny, with horizontal mergers receiving a more
thorough review). But see Mark N. Berry, Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergetw: In
Search of a Defense, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 515, 516 (1996) (arguing that
horizontal mergers do not always stifle competition and that horizontal mergers
actually promote efficiency and benefit consumers).
21. See Lisa Blumensaadt, Comment, Horizontal and Conglomerate Merger
Conditions: An hIterim Regulatory Approach for a Converged Environment, 8
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 291, 295-96, 306-08 (2000) (analyzing how rapid
technological changes have blurred the classical distinctions of industries,
customers, and media markets and proposing new guidelines for antitrust review
by regulatory agencies).
22. See id. (exploring new regulations to address deficiencies resulting from
evolving technologies and markets).
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Part I of this Comment explores the formation, procedure, and
philosophy of the Competition Commission.2 3 Part I discusses Phase
I and Phase II investigations by the Competition Commission and the
ability to appeal decisions to the European Court of Justice. Finally,
Part I examines the dominant position standard under European
Union law and analyzes how and when a company's dominant
position creates an adverse effect on competition.
Part II describes the merger review process employed by the
Competition Commission for various types of mergers.24
Specifically, it explores the rationale for applying a stricter standard
to horizontal mergers than vertical mergers. Part II further discusses
how the market share and barriers to market entry of the proposed
merged companies influences the Competition Commission's
decision whether the merger is compatible with the EU market
("Common Market").
Part III examines the manner in which the Competition
Commission conducted the review process of the AOL/Time Warner
merger.2 1 Part III explores the two major concerns of the Competition
Commission in conducting its review: the potential dominance by the
merged company over Internet access; and the ability to become a
gatekeeper in the emerging online music catalogue and player
industry.
Part IV analyzes the AOL/Time Warner review process and
illustrates the inherent flaws in applying traditional and outdated
merger stereotypes to new media and technology companies.26 The
Competition Commission failed to consider and analyze the future
effects of the AOL/Time Warner merger on the converging

23. See discussion infra notes 30-123 and accompanying text (providing
background on the European Commission on Competition, including its genesis,
the procedures of its Merger Task Force, and the process for rendering decisions
on appeal).

24. See infra notes 124-176

and accompanying

text (outlining the

Commission's approach to horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers).

25. See infra notes 177-220 and accompanying text (detailing an overview of
the Competition Commission's process, as well as outlining its concerns).
26. See infia notes 224-275 and accompanying text (characterizing the
Competition Commission's current standard as antithetical to the future market
activity of online, interactive multimedia).
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multimedia market. Additionally, Part IV explores the structural
defects of the Competition Commission that prevent it from
effectively enforcing antitrust concerns.
Part V provides recommendations to the Competition Commission
on how to improve the structure and review process to adequately
manage new and old technology mergers.27 The Competition
Commission should undertake a totally independent review of
proposed mergers, rather than rely on competitors' input, provide for
a realistic, expedited judicial review process, and allow an
efficiencies defense for horizontal mergers. This Comment concludes
that the proposed changes to the laws governing the Competition
Commission will improve the process and results of merger reviews
in the future. 28 A greater concentration of power, more efficiency,
and applying new rules to emerging technologies will create a more
independent and reliable Competition Commission.2"

I. BACKGROUND OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
COMMISSION ON COMPETITION
The Amsterdam Treaty governs the Competition Commission's
power to review mergers.3 0 The purpose of the Competition
Commission is to provide a consolidated, one-stop review process
for mergers and acquisitions that affect the European Union ("EU")
and the EU's member states.3 The Competition Commission only
27. See infra notes 277-327 and accompanying text (suggesting, among other
things, an increase in the centralization of power within the Competition

Commission and eradication of its strict time limits).
28. See id. (acknowledging that while the complex AOL/Time Warner merger
presented the Competition Commission with an arduous task, most of the
difficulties encountered were a result of the nature structure and process of the
Competition Commission itself).
29. See id.

30. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDhVG THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION,
THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN
RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafler TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM].

31. See AGREEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA, Jan. 3, 1994, art.
57(2), 1994 O.J. (L 1) 1 (requiring that the Competition Commission shall have
sole authority to review all proposed mergers having a community dimension); see
also BROBERG, supra note 9, at 180-84 (explaining how article 57 provides a one-
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has jurisdiction to review mergers that have an impact on the
European Community.32 The litmus test is whether or not a merger
will create a "dominant position '33 within the EU market ("Common
Market"), whereby such "dominant position" would have a negative
effect upon competition in the European Union: '
A. ESTABLISHING THE COMPETITION COMMISSION

The Treaty of Rome ("Rome Treaty") 35 first established guidelines
and principles on concentrations.36 The Treaty of Amsterdam
amended the Rome Treaty in 1997.37 Articles 81 and 8231 of the
stop shop to proposed mergers within the European Community).
32. See Council Regulation 4064/89 establishing the Merger Control
Regulation, art. 1(2), 1990 O.J. (L 257) 14, 16 [hereinafter Merger Regulations]
(legislating what constitutes a European Community dimension). A merger is
considered to have a Community impact when: a) the combined value of the
merger worldwide is greater than five billion European Currency Units ("ECUs"),
and b) the value of the merger within the EU is greater than two-hundred and fifty
million ECUs; unless, two-thirds of part b is concentrated in one EU country, then
that country's national competition laws shall apply. ki. See generally Morten B.
Broberg, Forum Shopping and the European Merger Control Regulation, 3
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 109, 110-12 (1996) (analyzing how the European Union defines
community dimension).
33. See discussion inra notes 90-100 (analyzing when a company has a
dominant position within a market).
34. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32 (setting forth the factors the
Competition Commission takes into account when deciding whether the merger
violates the Common Market); see also DORIS HILDEBRAND, TIlE ROLF OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN THE EC COMPETITION RULES 320-25 (1998) (examining
the roles dominance and market strength play in the Competition Commission's
review of proposed concentrations). See generally VALENTINE KORAH, AN
INT'RODUcTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE (6th ed. 1997)
(providing a framework of the economic analysis of abuse of a dominant position).
35. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. Mar. 25, 1957, 298

U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter "Rome Treaty"].
36. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32. art. 3 (defining a concentration). A
concentration is when two previously independent companies become a single
company through merger or acquisition. Id. The terms "concentration" and
"merger" are synonymous although the term -merger" is used throughout this
Comment.
37. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the replacement of
articles 81 and 82 of the Rome Treaty by articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Amsterdam).

140
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Amsterdam Treaty provide the principal competition rules." These
two articles empower the Competition Commission to formulate
policy and issue rulings on merger applications that effect the

38. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 30, art.
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 35). Articles 85

12 (renumbering the
and 86 in the Rome
Treaty became Articles 81 and 82, respectively, under the Treaty of Amsterdam.
See Tables of Equivalencies referred to in Article 12 of the TREATY 01:
AMSTERDAM, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 85 (providing a reference of old-to-new article
numbers).
39. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 30, art. 81, 1997 O.J. (C 340)
(stating the litmus test for merger review). Article 81 declares, in part: "The
following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trades between member-States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the Common Market." Id.
Prior to 1987, the Competition Commission did not believe that Article 81
could apply to mergers or acquisitions, although a committee of experts advised
them otherwise. See Giorgio Bernini, EEC Merger Regulation, Member State

Laws, and Articles 85 and 86, in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES,
611 (Barry Hawk ed., 1991) (discussing the expert's view that Article 81 could
apply to mergers and acquisitions that occurred in the form of joint ventures). The
R.J. Reynolds/Philip Morris case confirmed the expert's view and ruled that
Article 81 does apply to mergers because of the concern for anti-competitive
behavior. See Joined Cases 142 and 156/82, British-American Tobacco Co. Ltd. &
R.J. Reynolds Indus. Inc. v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487 (holding that when
agreements have anti-competitive features in them, Article 81 allows the
Competition Commission to block the proposed undertakings as not in the interest
of the Common Market).
Article 82 provides in part: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position within the Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market in so far as it may affect
trade between member-States." TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 30, art. 82.
The Continental Can case confirmed the expert's view as the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") held that an undertaking with a dominant position that
acquires a competitor could constitute an abuse that is contrary to the goals of the
Common Market. Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. Inc.
v. Commission, 2 E.C.R. 215 (1973). See Bernini, supra, at 612 (discussing how
the experts believed that Article 82 applied to concentration cases whereby a
competitor is acquired by an "undertaking" already enjoining a dominant position
within the market and how such acquisition could have an adverse effect on
competition). An undertaking is "[a] promise, engagement, or stipulation. An
engagement by one of the parties to a contract to the other, as distinguished from
the mutual engagement of the parties to each other." See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1369 (5th ed. 1979) . Thus, undertakings are simply the companies to
a proposed merger. Id.
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Common Market,40 including mergers between companies not
conducting business within the European Union." Within the
Commission, the Merger Task Force is responsible for handling the
daily operation of the Competition Commission concerning
mergers. 42 When a company files a merger notice with the
Competition Commission, the Competition Commission assigns the
case to one of the four operating units within the Merger Task
Force.43 Each operating unit is responsible for a different industry.'
Each unit, however, may utilize the expertise of other members.4 5
Ultimately, the Merger Task Force makes recommendations to the
Competition Commission, and the Competition Commission makes
the final decision on whether a merger will have an adverse effect on
competition in the European Union. 6

40. See J. DAVID BANKS, MERGER LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
AUSTRALIA AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 147 (1999) (discussing how the
Competition Commission began to rely on Articles 81 and 82 to provide protection
to Community members during the merger boom in the 1960s).
41. See infra notes 266-268 and accompanying text (examining the
Competition Commission's review of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger
because the merger affected Airbus, a European company, even though neither
Boeing nor McDonnell Douglas had offices within the Common Market).
42. See C.J. COOK & C.S. KERSE, E.C. MERGER CONTROL 8-9 (3d ed. 2000)
(explaining the Merger Task Force applies the Merger Regulation cited in Articles
81 and 82).
43. See id. at 91 (explaining the Competition Commission's procedures for
delegating responsibility in approving mergers), see also Mario Siragusa, Merger
Control and State Aids Panel: Merger Control in the European Community, 9
CONN. J. INT'L L. 535, 539-42 (1994) (discussing the formation, role, and
procedures the Merger Task Force utilizes after receiving pre-file notification).

44. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 91 (explaining that each unit in the
Competition Commission's Directorate is comprised of several examiners and staff
with expertise in a particular industry sector).
45. See id. (explaining that although each team within the Merger Task Force
works independently, team members with a particular expertise will often assist
other teams).
46. See generally BANKS, supra note 40, at 199-202 (outlining the decisionmaking process the Competition Commission employs, and asserting that the final
decision is political, as opposed to merely administrative).
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B. PROCEDURE OF THE COMPETITION COMMITTEE'S MERGER
TASK FORCE

Upon receiving a case, the assigned task force unit is responsible

for gathering information and making a recommendation to the
Merger Task Force.47 In the course of gathering information, the unit
may rely upon independent experts' opinions and knowledge.48 The
period within which the Merger Task Force has to operate and make
a decision, however, is quite narrow.49 Therefore, upon notification,
the Competition Commission immediately institutes initial
proceedings.50 During these initial proceedings, notice of the
proposed merger is published in the Official Journal of the European
Communities.5 Any interested parties have ten days from the given
notice to provide the Merger Task Force with any relevant
information.52 The initial proceedings typically last four weeks, but
may be extended to six weeks under certain circumstances. 3 During

47. See Siragusa, supra note 43, at 540 (explaining that the recommendation is
based on whether the merger significantly impedes effective competition in the
common market).
48. See id. (indicating that the Merger Task Force is not limited by its internal
knowledge, but has the ability to consult other s in formatting a decision).
49. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32, at art. 10(0) (outlining the time
limits the Competition Commission must observe). The Competition Commission
must provide copies of the pre-merger filings with the member-states within three
days and must also publish notification to ensure that concerned parties have
enough time to respond within the ten-day window, as allowed under the
regulations. Id.
50. See id. at art. 6 (stating that the Competition Commission must examine the
pre-merger notification upon receipt).
51. See, e.g., Prior Notification of a Concentration (Case COMP/M.1845 AOL/Time Warner), 2000 O.J. (C 130) 8 (announcing the proposed merger
between AOL and Time Warner).
52. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32, at art. 6(2) (specifying that notice
must be given without delay).
53. See id. at art. 10(1) (setting forth a four week time limit for the Competition
Commission to make a decision unless it receives notice from a member-state that
the proposed merger threatens competition in that member-state, then the
Competition Commission is given six weeks to make a decision); see also
Commission Regulation 447/98 of 1 March 1998 on the Notifications, Time Limits
and Hearings Provided for in Council Regulation No 4064/89 on the Control of
Concentrations between Undertakings, art. 6-8, 1998 O.J. (L 61) I, 4-5 (detailing
the time when the review process begins to toll, when the review period ends, and
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the initial proceedings, the Competition Commission determines
whether the merger raises serious doubts of a negative impact on
competition within the Common Market.54 At the end of the initial
proceedings, if the merger raises serious doubts, the Competition
Committee will initiate second stage proceedings. If there are no
serious doubts arising from the initial proceedings, the Competition
Committee will declare the merger compatible with the Common
Market."5
The Competition Commission institutes second stage, or Phase II,
proceedings, when it is unsure of the extent of the merger's negative
effect upon competition after the initial proceedings. 6 The
Competition Commission then has four months to issue a final ruling
on the proposed merger.5 7 During this time, if the Competition
Commission believes the merger will have a negative effect upon
competition, it must prepare a written statement of objections and
provide the undertakings an opportunity to respond. 51
Often, the Competition Commission vill approve a merger with
conditions that must be met within a specified time period after the
approval.5 9 At other times, the Competition Commission will grant
when the Competition Commission is granted extensions for holidays and
incomplete or inaccurate information).
54. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32, at art. 6(1) (requiring the
Competition Commission to declare a concentration compatible with the Common
Market during the initial proceedings unless there are serious concerns about the
effect of the concentration on competition).
55. See id. (indicating that if the concentration is compatible with the common
market, the Competition Commission need not take further steps).
56. See id. (authorizing the Competition Commission to institute proceedings
when there are serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration with the
aim of the Common Market).
57. See id. at art. 10(3)(4) (noting the four month period to complete
proceedings and the exceptions to the four month period). The four month window
may be extended while the Competition Commission awaits replies and requests
for additional information from the undertakings. i.
58. See Commission Regulation 447/98. art. 13(2). 1998 O.J. (L 61) 1, 7
(detailing the procedure for the Competition Commission to provide notice of
objection to undertakings and involved parties).
59. See discussion infra note 220 and accompanying text (describing the
conditions the Competition Commission placed upon AOLfime Warner after
approving the merger).
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provisional approval, with final approval predicated upon the
fulfillment of certain conditions. 60 These conditional approvals allow
undertakings to merge, while giving the Competition Commission a
method to protect competition in the Common Market and encourage
economic growth. 6' The use of conditional approvals allows the
Competition Commission and the undertakings to each achieve their
primary goals; the Competition Commission seeking to protect
competition, and the undertakings receiving merger approval.6
When the undertakings are unhappy with the Competition
Commission's decisions they may look to the courts for judicial
63
relief.
C. APPEALING DECISIONS OF THE COMPETITION COMMISSION

The decisions of the Competition Commission are subject to legal
review by the European Court of Justice ("ECJ").M6 Article 230 of the
Treaty of Amsterdam gives the ECJ the power to review Competition
60. See, e.g., Thomas Mueller, What Worries Monti: New Economy Concerns
are Driving The European Union to Stricter Scrutiny, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 6, 2000,
at 35 (describing how divestiture of an entire business unit is a common preapproval condition).
61. See EEC Council: Regulation No 17: First Regulation Implementing
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, art. 8(1), 1962 O.J. (13) 204 (allowing the
Competition Commission to impose conditions and obligations to an exemption
decision). The difference between a condition and an obligation is the result of' its
breach. Id. A breach of a condition immediately results in the revocation of the
exemption. Id. A breach of an obligation allows the Competition Commission to
further review, and possibly withdraw, the exemption. Id. See also Alexander
Schaub, Modernization of EC Competition Law: Reform of Regulation 17, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 752, 753-54 (2000) (analyzing the current status of the
Competition Commission's power to grant exemptions and proposing ways to
increase the effectiveness of the regulation).
62. See Schaub, supra note 61, at 753 (discussing the Competition
Commission's use of conditions to protect competition within the Community
while not overly interfering with free market principles). The use of conditions
allows businesses to achieve the maximum advantage for their shareholders and
allows the Competition Commission to protect competition within the Common
Market. Id.
63. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 30, art. 230 (indicating that any
undertaking or third party who has a direct and individual stake in the outcome of
the Competition Commission's decision may appeal to the ECJ).
64. See id. (stating that the ECJ has the authority to review acts of' the
European Council and the Competition Commission, and take corrective action).
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Commission decisions.65 This appellate review power, however, is
limited.66
If an undertaking decides to appeal a decision, the Court of First
Instance hears the appeal. 67 The Court of First Instance's review is
conducted de novo, as the Court reviews the Competition
Commission's findings of fact and law.6" The Court of First Instance,
however, does not review the record on appeal, as an appellate court
in the United States would. The Court can request the production of
documents, call and examine witnesses and experts, and order further
inquiries.69 Once the Court of First Instance issues a ruling, that
decision can be appealed to the ECJ within a two-month period.7"
The appeal must be based upon a point of law.7"
The legal merits upon which an undertaking may appeal a decision
of the Competition Commission are narrow. The first basis for an
65. See C.S. KERSE, E.C. ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 41-42 (4th ed. 1998)
(outlining the ability of the ECJ to hear appeals brought by direct and indirect

parties to the original decision).
66. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 30. art. 230 (stating the grounds
upon which a party may appeal a decision of the Competition Commission). The
legality of Competition Commission decisions can only be challenged on the
grounds of: 1) lack of competence; 2) infringement of a critical procedural
requirement; 3) infringement of the Treaty of Amsterdam or any law relating to the
Treaty's application; and 4) abuse of power by the Competition Commission. I.
67. See KERSE, supra note 65, at 43 (discussing the creation of the Court of
First Instance and its role in thoroughly reviewing the facts and rulings of the
Competition Commission in appeals cases).
68. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 30, art. 229 (creating the ECJ's
unlimited jurisdiction to review Competition Commission decisions); see also
Case T-7/89, SA Hercules v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 11-1711 (asserting that one
purpose in creating the Court of First Instance was to allow it to undertake an
extensive review of the facts upon which the Competition Commission based its
decisions and to ensure that the facts supported the Competition Commission's
decisions).
69. See LENNART RiTTER ET AL., EC COMPETITION LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE 908-09 (2d ed. 2000) (outlining the procedures utilized by the Court of First
Instance to review the facts presented in the case).
70. See id. at 909 (discussing the right to appeal decisions of the Court of First
Instance).
71. See id. (specifying that parties may only appeal based on lack of
jurisdiction, procedural irregularity, or a violation of a European Community
regulation).
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Commission and the United States on appeal for a lack of
competence.74 Second, an abuse of power by the Competition
Commission is grounds for appeal." Such an appeal rarely succeeds,

as it requires evidence of overreaching or vindictive use of granted
powers.

The third basis for an appeal is an infringement of procedural
standards.77 A successful appeal must prove that but for the
infringement of procedural standards, the decision of the
Competition Commission likely would have been different.7"
Infringement of procedures, such as failing or delaying to provide
documents79 or notices," not allowing undertakings the right to

72. See discussion supra note 66 and accompanying text (outlining the grounds
for appeal to the ECJ).
73. See Case 792/79, Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 119
[1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 334 (1981) (holding that the Competition Commission
erroneously claimed it did not have the power to impose interim measures).
74. See Case 327/91, French Republic v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641
(holding invalid an agreement executed by the Competition Commission because
the European Council, not the Competition Commission has jurisdiction to enter
into such agreements).
75. See discussion supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the
grounds for ECJ appeal).
76. See, e.g., Case 53/85, AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO Chemic UK Ltd. v.
Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 1965, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 231 (1987) (claiming that the
Commission abused its power by subpoenaing documents that could later be used
against the company in another court).
77. See supra note 66 (establishing the grounds upon which a Court of First
Instance decision may be appealed to the ECJ).
78. See, e.g.. Case 30/78, Distillers Co. Ltd. V. Commission, 6 E.C.R. 2229,
[1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 121 (1980), para. 26 (indicating that there are procedural
irregularities, but the ECJ will not consider those irregularities because the absence
of such irregularities would not have led to a different conclusion); see also Joined
Cases 209-215 & 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck Sdrl & Others v. Commission,
1980 E.C.R. 3125, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 134 (1980), para. 47 (holding that there is no
evidence the procedural irregularities influenced the decision of the Commission in
any manner).
79. See Joined Cases 209/215 & 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck Sirl & Others
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respond to concerns, 8 or failure to adequately explore settlement
options 2 are some of the procedural violations the ECJ held as not
serious enough to prove that a decision would have been different."
The final basis for an appeal of a decision is that the Competition
Commission infringed upon the Treaty of Amsterdam and governing
law. 84 A successful appeal occurs if the Competition Commission
misapplied the law to the facts presented, or if it applied the wrong
legal principle.85
If the ECJ rules that the Competition Commission violated the
law, it will send the case back to the Competition Commission for
reconsideration or another review process.8 6 The ECJ, however, does
v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 3125 (stating that the refusal by the Commission to
show company documents might be a procedural violation, although the decision
in this case was upheld for other reasons).
80. See Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R.
619 (holding that delaying delivery of hearing minutes did not constitute a
procedural violation).
81. See id. (holding that a delay in providing a written statement of objections
did not deny the company the chance to adequately respond to the statement of
objections).
82. See Joined Cases 43/82 & 63/82, Vereniging ter Bevordering van het
Vlaamse Boekwezen, VBVB, & Vereniging ter Bevordering van de Belangen des
Boekhandels, VBBB v. Commission, 1984 E.C.R. 19 (holding that the
Commission may indicate possible terms to reach a settlement, but is not required
to make any offers).
83. But see Joined Cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94,
T-328/94 & T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV, Elf Atochem SA,
BASF AG, Shell Int'l Chem. Co. Ltd., DSM NV and DSNI Kunststoffen BV,
Wacker-Chemie GmbH, Hoechst AG, Societe artesienne de vinyle, Montedison
SpA, Imperial Chem. Indus. plc. Huls AG and Enichem SpA v. Commission, 1999
E.C.R. 11-931, para. 1021 (holding that the Competition Commission violated
appellants' fights to openly access the case file, and such infringement had a likely
chance of affecting the Competition Commission's decision).
84. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 30, art. 230 (establishing the
grounds upon which a Court of First Instance decision may be appealed to the

ECJ).
85. See, e.g., Case 26/75, General Motors Cont'l NV v. Commission, 1975
E.C.R. 1367 (annulling decision by the Competition Commission for misapplying
the abuse by a dominant position standard).
86. See Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV, supra note 83, para. 7 (holding that
the Competition Commission may subsequently issue a new decision addressed to
the successful litigant).
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not substitute its own judgment for that of the Commission." Instead,
the ECJ indicates where the Commission erred and requires the
Commission to conduct proceedings applying the correct law,
application, or procedure.8" The Competition Commission must abide
by the ruling of the ECJ.80 Many of the appeals to the ECJ concern
the Competition Commission's interpretation of whether a proposed
merger constitutes a dominant position.
D. CREATION OF OR STRENGTHENING A DOMINANT POSITION
Before the Competition Commission declares a proposed merger
contrary to the Common Market, it must find that the proposed
merger creates or strengthens a dominant position within the
Common Market.90 There is no bright-line test to determine
dominance; dominance is subjective and open to interpretation.9
Dominance is viewed on a sliding scale, with varying degrees of
dominance based upon market influence and the ability to act
independently of consumers and competitors. 92
On an economic level, a dominant position is the ability to

87. See Case T-110/95, Int'l Express Carriers Conference (IECC) v.
Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 11-3605, para. 33 (stating that the ECJ does not issue
orders to the Competition Commission, but the Competition Commission is
required under Article 233 of the Treaty of Amsterdam to comply with the
decision).
88. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 30, art. 233 (stating that the
Competition Commission is required to abide by the decisions of the ECJ and must
take all necessary actions to comply with the ECJ rulings).
89. Id.
90. See Alessandro Bertolini & Francesco Parisi, The Rise of Structuralisin in
European Merger Control, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 13, 20-23 (1996) (discussing the
impact of collective domination under the merger regulations).
91. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32, at art. 2(3) (stating that mergers
that create or strengthen a dominant position that significantly impede effective
competition within the Common Market will not receive approval); see also Sergio
Baches Opi, Merger Control in the United States and European Union: tlow
Should the United States' Experience Influence the Enforcement of the Council
Merger Regulation?, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 223, 271-78 (1997) (discussing
what the Competition Commission considers when determining dominance).
92. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 130 (indicating that, without a clear
definition of dominance, many factors blur distinctions, making dominance a very
subjective determination).
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influence factors in the relevant market free from constraint by
competitors and/or consumers.9 3 The level of market share is a
leading factor in determining dominance." The ECJ held in HojjmanLa Roche95 that except in extraordinary circumstances, the existence
of a very large market share constitutes a dominant position.' A
substantial market share, however, does not evidence a dominant
position, and the issue of whether a market share is considered
dominant will vary depending on the marketY Other factors
considered in a dominance analysis include technological
advantages, market gap between concentration and nearest
competitor, and market turnover.9
Determining dominance,
however, also requires defining the relevant markets and projecting
99
future market activities.
The Competition Commission published its guidelines on how it
defines relevant markets in 1997.1° How vague or narrow the
93. See Case C-250/92, Gottriip-klim e.a. Grovvareforeninger v. Dansk
Landbrugs Grovvareselskad AmbA, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5641, para. 47 (defining a
dominant position as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant
market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of
its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers.").
94. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 152-56 (stating that market shares
have a direct correlation to market power, and market power determines
dominance.)
95. Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R.
461.
96. See id. para. 41 (explaining the significance of the possession of large
market shares).
97. See id. para. 40 (commenting on the importance of substantial market
share).
98. See id. paras. 42-48 (indicating that a combination of various factors of the
Hoffman-La Roche merger constituted findings of a dominant position). The
Commission noted that Hoffman-La Roche had exclusive use of patents, giving it a
technological advantage. Id. Further, the Commission found that the large gap in
market shares between Hoffman-La Roche and its nearest competitor, which
continued to remain large over the years, indicated a lack of effective competition,
and that Hoffman-La Roche's sales were greater than all of its other competitors
combined. Id.
99. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 128-31 (discussing what constitutes
a dominant position).
100. See Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the
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Competition Commission defines the relevant market of a proposed

merger affects the likelihood of approval.' 0 ' It requires assessment of
the product market and geographic market.' 02
Relevant product markets are those markets that consist of all
goods that are "interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer."' "
Relevant geographic markets are those markets whereby the
undertakings are involved in "the supply and demand of products or
services," where competition is fairly uniform, and the circumstances
surrounding competition are appreciably distinguished from other
geographic markets.' °4 Therefore, the affected market is determined
by a combination of the product and geographic markets.' 05
E. DOMINANT POSITION HAVING AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON
COMPETITION

Determining that a concentration would create or strengthen a
dominant position is only one step in analyzing a merger; whether
the dominant position would adversely impede effective competition
is the second step. 0 6 Establishing or strengthening a dominant

position in the Common Market is not contrary to European Union
law. 10 7 Only when the creation or strengthening of a dominant
Purposes of Community Competition Law, 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5 [hereinafter
Commission Notice] (establishing the standards for relevant market share for the
notification procedures under the merger regulations). These guidelines amended
previous ones issued by the Competition Commission in 1989. Id. The guidelines'
purpose is to properly identify competitors that can provide effective competition
to proposed concentrations. Id. at art. 2.
101. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 132-33 (explaining that tile
Competition Commission often defines markets narrowly in order to sustain
competition and protect markets).
102.

See id. (describing how a determination of approval is reached).

103. Commission Notice, supra note 100, at art. 7.
104. See id. at art. 8.
105. See id. at art. 9 (basing the definition on case law and the Competition
Commission's internal decision-making process).
106. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32, at art. 2(3) (requiring a merger to
create a dominant position such that the dominant position significantly impedes
effective competition before nullifying the merger as incompatible with the
Common Market).
107. See LENNART RITTER ET AL., EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 77 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing that the purpose of Article 8 1
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position would have a significant negative impact on competition in
all, or substantially all, of the Common Market, will the Competition
Commission reject a proposed merger."1 A merger may create or
strengthen a dominant position that will not have an adverse effect
on competition. 109 It is also possible for a merger to have a negative
effect on competition, where the impact is regional or insignificant,
and therefore not in violation of the Merger Regulations. t
It appears that the regulations set the bar extremely high for the

Competition Commission to reject a merger application."' Such a
tough standard favors undertakings and
little fear of rejection." 21 The standard,
Competition Commission to approve the
These conditions can precede approval

their ability to merge with
however, does allow the
mergers with conditions. '
of the merger in that the

undertakings must divest certain products or services, or follow
approval whereby undertakings agree not to execute any exclusive
deals for a period of years." 4 The ability of the Competition
is not to prevent effective business decisions that might lead to the creation of a
dominant position, but to prevent the restriction on competition from abuse by a
company in a dominant position).
108. See id. at 92 (discussing the evaluation of "object or effect" in the
economic context).
109. See id. at 115-16 (discussing the conditions whereby the Competition
Commission will grant an exemption for the creation or strengthening of a
dominant position). The overall test requires that the benefits of allowing an
undertaking must outweigh the detriments, such as economic benefits to customers
and consumers. Id. But see discussion infra notes 316-317 and accompanying text
(discussing how the Competition Commission has not recognized the economic
benefits to a customer test because the Merger Regulations consider efficiencies as
barriers to competition).
110. See id. (indicating that the Competition Commission is only interested, and
legally allowed to regulate, mergers having a community-wide impact).
111. See id. at 117 (discussing the overwhelming number of merger applications
approved by the Competition Commission).
112. See id. (believing that a tough standard for merger rejection allows
undertakings to take advantage of the rules).
113. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32 (granting the Competition
Commission the power to impose conditions and obligations on undertakings to
make the merger compatible with the Common Market).
114. See, e.g., Commission Decision of 8 July 1998 Declaring a Concentration
to be Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA
Agreement (Case IVIM.1069 - WorldCom/MCl). 1999 O.J. (L 116) 1 (allowing
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Commission to negotiate and compromise on conditions allows for a
stringent standard for outright rejection." 5 A lower standard would
allow for less compromise and would be detrimental to undertakings
that have an adverse effect on competition in some markets or

products, as they would face a lower chance of merger approval.'
Although the conditions to approval can be so onerous that
sometimes the effect is to bar the proposed merger, more often, a
negotiated compromise is achieved that is acceptable to all parties. "7
In addition, the Competition Commission looks at the potential for
collective dominance in reviewing merger applications."I Collective

dominance is the ability of a few competitors in a market to act in a
manner that has the same anti-competitive effects of a single
dominant company." 9 The Competition Commission focuses on
"degree of concentration, price transparency, product homogeneity,
cost symmetry, slow market growth, barriers to entry, or structural

links." 20 Collective dominance is a controversial policy because it
MCI/WorldCom merger upon condition that MCI divest itself of its Internet
backbone service); Commission Decision of 17 July 1996 Relating to a Proceeding
Pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 (IV/M.553
RTL/Veronica/Endemol), 1996 O.J. (L 294) 14 (ruling requiring that a television
station not change format for a period of five years without first securing
Competition Commission approval).
115. See Mueller, supra note 60, at 35 (discussing the stricter scrutiny applied
by the Competition Commission in light of its widened use conditions).
116. See id. (indicating that the Competition Commission, with a looser
standard, would have a greater ability to deem mergers not compatible with the
Common Market).
117. See BANKS, supra note 40, at 200-02 (discussing the flexible approach
taken by the Competition Commission combined with the rigid deadline
encourages all parties to reach an agreement).
118. See Joined Cases C 68/94 & C 30/95, France v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R.
1-1375 (holding that dominance not only applies to single firm dominance, but also
to oligopolistic or collective dominance); see also Mueller, supra note 60, at 35
(discussing the increased use of the collective dominance standard to either block
or modify proposed mergers).
119. See Mueller, supra note 60, at 35 (describing the activities as either an
implicit agreement among the competitors or identical behavior that has the result
of an implicit agreement).
120. Commissioner Mario Monti, The Main Challenges for a New Decade of
EC Merger Control, Address at EC Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference,
at
(Sept.
15,
2000),
available
Brussels
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=S PEECI I/
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allows the Competition Commission to conclude that smaller market
share mergers have the ability collectively to dominate, although
individually they cannot. 12-1 The controversy arises due to a
presupposed notion that companies will conspire with, rather than
compete against, each other in a given market.'22 The European
Union, however, seems to believe that for the most part, companies
will not conspire to collectively dominate the market, which should
reduce the concern of over-reliance on the collective dominance
theory, unlike the policy of the United States that assumes that
companies will conspire if allowed .13

II. COMPETITION COMMISSION'S APPROACH TO
HORIZONTAL, VERTICAL, AND
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
The manner in which the Competition Commission classifies a
proposed merger affects the scope and depth of the review process.' 4
The Competition Commission judges all mergers upon whether the
merger strengthens or establishes a dominant position within the
market and whether such a dominant position adversely affects
00/31 l0IRAPID&lg=EN [hereinafter Commissioner Monti Speech].
121. See Mueller, supra note 60, at 35 (explaining that the policy is
controversial because of the lack of proof needed to determine that firms will
collectively dominate). Commissioner Monti has acknowledged the disagreement,
stating that, "analysis of collective dominance will be the analytical tool that will
face the most challenges over the next decade." Commissioner Monti Speech,
supra note 120.
122. See Mueller, supra note 60, at 36 (indicating that on a basic economic level
it is more beneficial for companies to conspire than compete, hence the belief that
companies act in their best economic interest).
123. See Thomas E. Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and the
European Union: Some Observations, 74 ST. JOIHN's L. REv. 305, 335 (2000)
[hereinafter Kauper, Merger Control] (stating that the United States assumes
companies will attempt to collectively dominate when economically profitable, but
the European Union believes that firms will attempt to compete against each other
and attempt to keep prices lower).
124. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that the levels of
scrutiny for mergers is directly related to the type of merger); see also COOK &
KERSE, supra note 42, at 148-49 (stating that almost all cases involving horizontal
mergers receive in-depth review while cases involving vertical mergers rarely
receive more than a cursory review).
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competition. 2 ' The Competition Commission only rejects as contrary
to the Common Market those mergers that satisfy both parts of the
test.1 6 The threshold whereby the Competition Commission reviews
27
mergers is lower for horizontal than vertical mergers.
A. HORIZONTAL MERGER REVIEW

A primary concern of the EU's competition law is the percentage
of market share the proposed concentration will control. 28 A merger
between competitors increases the market share of the proposed
concentration and removes a competitor from the market.'"
Additionally, a company that controls a larger market share vis-a-vis
its competitors can dominate the market through buying power,
setting prices, and establishing barriers to market entry."'" This
ability to dominate is especially visible where a market is highly
fractionalized, where no competitor controls a majority of the
market.' 3' The market leader could control as little as ten percent,
although such a small percentage will not likely constitute
125. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 149-50 (discussing the important
considerations of the Competition Commission in determining whether a proposed
merger is compatible with the Common Market).
126. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (explaining that an
undertaking can create a dominant position, but a dominant position is only
contrary to the Common Market when the dominant position has the ability to
negatively affect competition).
127. See Commission Regulation 4064/89 of I March 1998 Form CO Relating
to the Notification of a Concentration Pursuant to Regulation, Annex, 1998 O.J. (L
61) 1 [hereinafter Form CO] (requiring notification for vertical mergers when tile
effected market share will be twenty-five percent or greater, while requiring
notification of horizontal mergers when the affected market share will be fifteen
percent or greater). Under such a definition, the Competition Commission only
recognizes two types of mergers, horizontal and vertical. Id.
128. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 152-56 (discussing how market share
is important, but only in the context of the market's overall strength and level of
competition).
129. See supra note 14 (defining a horizontal merger as a merger between two
competitors, thereby removing the competitor from the market).
130. See JONATHAN FAULL & ALl NIKPAY, TiIE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 12236 (1999) (discussing what actions constitute an abuse of a dominant position).
131. See id. at 125-26 (controlling a large minority in a fractionalized market
makes it easier to dominate since it would require several competitors to align to
be competitive).
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dominance.1 32
The Competition Commission requires a review process for any
merger that affects the markets.1 3 A market is affected when a
proposed horizontal merger controls more than fifteen percent of the
market share. 34 Such a low threshold reflects the Competition
Commission's concern regarding horizontal mergers and their
potential for negative impact upon the Common Market.'
In addition to setting a lower threshold to trigger the review
process for horizontal mergers, the standard for review is stricter for
horizontal than for vertical mergers due to a greater possibility that a
horizontal merger will negatively affect competition than will a
vertical merger. 36 The elimination of a competitor through a merger
eliminates choice to consumers in markets.'3 When no other
competition exists, a company has a monopoly over the market,
allowing it to dictate terms and prices for the company's products or
services. 11 8 These concerns are normally not present in vertical
mergers, thereby allowing the Competition Commission to review
vertical mergers with less scrutiny. 9

132. See, e.g., Case 75/84, Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. KG v.
Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 3021 (holding that a ten percent market share precludes
a finding of dominance and the merger was therefore compatible with the Common
Market).
133. See Form CO, supra note 127 (defining affected markets as those markets
where a concentration will control a market share of fifteen percent for horizontal
mergers and twenty-five percent for vertical mergers).
134. See id.
135. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened level
of scrutiny given to horizontal mergers).
136. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 151 (explaining how a horizontal
merger poses a greater threat to significantly impede effective competition than a
vertical merger).
137. See id. at 156-58 (examining the role elimination of significant competitors
plays in the competition review and the need for other companies to provide viable
competition to the proposed undertaking).
138. See Sam D. Johnson & A. Michael Ferrill, Defining Competition:
Economic Analysis and Antitrust Decisionmaking, 36 BAYLOR L. RE'. 583, 59192 (1984) (discussing the economic consequences of monopolies in markets).
139. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 165 (explaining that vertical mergers
do not normally reduce competition or effect market shares).
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Anti-competitive behavior that is present in both horizontal and
vertical mergers is the establishment of barriers preventing entry into
the market. These barriers consist of absolute and strategic
40
advantages and exclusionary practices of the merged company.1

Absolute advantages occur when the incumbent controls, or has
access to resources only available to the incumbent.' Strategic
advantages result from being the first or established participant in a
market. 42 New entrants into a market can only overcome this
advantage with time and money. 43 The amount of time and capital

required might preclude earning profits for a long period of time,

44
effectively creating a barrier to the market.1
The last type of barrier to entry is an exclusionary practice. ' 1
Exclusionary practices often overlap absolute advantages, however,
they include such actions as predatory pricing 46 and exclusive
dealing, 47 preventing potential competitors from access to necessary
48
services and products.

140. See id. at 159-60 (stating that barriers can be classified into three types,
although the types can and do overlap in some aspects).
141. See id. at 158-59 (discussing absolute advantages that could create a barrier
to market entry). Some absolute advantages would include legal restrictions on
market entry and ownership of essential assets, or intellectual property rights that
give a company exclusive rights to technology or property. 11.
142. See id. at 158-60 (explaining that strategic advantages include brand name
recognition and loyalty, established marketing and distribution systems, and
general goodwill (intangibles)).
143. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 158-60 (discussing strategic
advantages and methods to overcome this barrier to entry).
144. See Case 27/76, United Brands Co. & United Brands Cont'l BV v.
Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207 (holding that a requirement of large capital
expenditures to enter a market constitutes a barrier to entry because the economics
of scale prevent the new competitor from realizing any economic gains in the short
term, risking loss of the entire investment).
145. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 158-59 (describing how exclusionary
practices can act as a barrier to trade).
146. See Case 111/96, ITT Promedia NV v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 11-2937
(holding that predatory pricing practices can constitute abuse).
147. See Case 65/89, BPB Industries Plc & British Gypsum Ltd. v. Commission,
1993 E.C.R. 11-389 (ruling that the execution of an exclusive purchasing contract
for plasterboard restricted competition in the market and constituted an abuse of a
dominant position).
148. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 159-60 (explaining the use of
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Market share and barriers to entry are the two most important

criteria the Competition Commission looks to when determining
whether a merger will significantly impede competition within the
Common Market. 149 Other elements that are taken into consideration
are economic and financial power of the undertakings,'5 0 the power
and influence customers can exert upon the undertaking,' and the
ability to freely access commodities and markets.' 2 The Competition
Commission considers all of these factors together in determining
whether the proposed merger is compatible with the Common

Market.'53
B. VERTICAL MERGER REVIEW
Unlike horizontal mergers, vertical mergers receive less scrutiny
because they present less of a threat to competition.' The threshold
to trigger a review for a vertical merger is twenty-five percent, as
opposed to fifteen percent for horizontal mergers, reflecting the
lesser concern for vertical mergers.' 5 5 In recent years, however, the
exclusionary practices as barriers to entry, specifically the use of predatory
pricing).
149. See generally Timothy J. Dorsey, The European Community Merger
Regulation: Questions Answered, Uncertainties Remain, 8 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F.
95, 110-11 (1993) (describing the various factors considered in determining
whether a merger significantly impedes competition).
150. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 161-62 (discussing how the ability of
a powerful firm to significantly increase production might pose a barrier to entry).
151. See id. at 160-61 (explaining that some products, such as Coca-Cola, are in
such demand that consumers can force corporations to refrain from engaging in
certain market abuses).
152. See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text (describing the concerns
over vertical mergers and the subsequent market effects taken into consideration
by the Competition Commission in determining whether the proposed merger is
compatible with the Common Market).
153. See Dorsey, supra note 149, at 108-12 (discussing how the Competition
Commission considers competition factors, such as geographic market, dominant
position, and significant impediment in its decisions).
154. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42, at 151-52 (explaining that since a
vertical merger does not remove a competitor from the market it poses a lesser
threat to competition than a horizontal merger).
155. See Form CO, supra note 127, § 6, 11, "Affected Markets" (indicating
different threshold amounts that trigger a duty to report for vertical and horizontal
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Competition Commission has reviewed vertical mergers with greater
scrutiny. 56
Although vertical mergers receive less scrutiny, they are still
subject to Article 81 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The ECJ held in
Consten and Grundigv. Commission157 that Article 81 does not make
any distinction between vertical and horizontal restraints on
competition, and neither would the court.' 58 In order to limit the
number of vertical mergers blocked, the Court applies a de minimus
standard,'59 stating that simple restraint on competition is not
enough; 160 the restraint must be appreciable.' 6' The Commission,

however, only needs to show that the merger has the ability to
appreciably affect competition, not that it actually has had such
affect. 62 Recently, the Commission approved the Notice on
Agreements of Minor Importance 63 whereby it amended the de
mergers).
156. See Arthur J. Burke et al., InternationalAntitrust, 33 INT'L LAW. 277, 28788 (1999) (discussing the new guidelines concerning vertical mergers and how the
Competition Commission is instituting more Phase 11investigations into vertical
mergers than ever before).
157. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Establissements Consten SARL v. Commission,
1966 E.C.R. 299.
158. See id. at 339 (ruling that the standard of significantly impeding
competition in the Common Market applies equally to horizontal and vertical
mergers).
159. See Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, 1997 O.J. (C372/13) 4
[hereinafter Notice on Agreements] (declaring that certain agreements that fall
below announced thresholds cannot constitute an appreciable restriction on
competition and therefore are not subject to review by the Competition
Commission). Under the de mininmus standard, horizontal mergers that constitute
five percent or less of the aggregate market share and vertical mergers that
constitute ten percent or less are exempt from the jurisdiction of the Competition
Commission; see also RITTER ET AL., supra note 69, at 103-09 (detailing the
effects of the de mininus standard on vertical competition).
160. See Case 319/82, Societe de Vente de Ciments et Betons de l'Est SA v
Kerpen & Kerpen GmbH und Co. KG v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 4173, 4183
(holding that a contract affecting ten percent of trade from France to Germany in a
given product market is large enough to have an appreciable effect on
competition).
161. See id.
162. See id. (stating that a contract that has the potential to negatively affect
competition is contrary to the Common Market and is therefore null and void).
163. See Notice on Agreements, supra note 159, at 4 (establishing the de

2001]

MEGA MERGER, MEGA PROBLEMS

minimus rule to exclude mergers that would not result in greater than
ten percent of aggregate market shares (five percent for
conglomerate mergers) from the application of Article 8 1 .11 Lastly,
the Commission has issued block exemptions to certain vertical
transactions, holding that they could never effectively restrict
competition, thereby reducing the number of applications and

reviews for vertical mergers. 65
The concern of anti-competitive behavior in vertical mergers
occurs when the undertaking creates barriers to entry into the market
through exclusionary practices.' 66 For example, Company A,

involved in fruit production, buys packing and transportation
companies to move the goods from the local farm to the market.
Company A further acquires a marketing and distribution company

to sell the goods. If any of these acquired companies, however, were
providing service to several sellers and as a result of the acquisition,

refuse to do business anymore except with Company A, the result
would be that
67
competition.

Company

A

has

effectively

restricted

its

minimus standards for Competition Commission review of horizontal and vertical
mergers).
164. See id. (creating a safe harbor against review for undertakings that fall
below the threshold).
165. See Communication from the Commission on the Application of the
Community Competition Rules to Vertical Restraints - Follow-up to the Green
Paper on Vertical Restraints, 1998 O.J. (C 365) 3 (proposing certain transactions
for which an exemption is automatically granted). The current block exemptions
are granted for exclusive distribution, exclusive purchasing, and franchising. Id.
The proposed block exemptions will cover all vertical agreements for all
intermediate and final goods and services, with an exception for some types of
"hardcore restraints," such as minimum and fixed resale prices and absolute
territorial protection. Id.
166. See COOK & KERSE, supra note 42. at 165-68 (discussing the concern of

anti-competitive behavior in vertical mergers occurs when a company acquires a
supplier, whereby such acquisition is likely to cut off a competitor from accessing
the goods of the supplier). Id.
167. See, e.g., Case 27/76, United Brands Co. & United Brands Cont'l BV v.
Commission of European Communities, 1978 E.C.R. 207 (holding that a
requirement that a company's distributor refuse sales to competitors under certain
circumstances constitutes an abuse of a dominant position). But see Case 102J77,
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH. 1978 E.C.R. 1139 (stating that the use of a
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Another concern of vertical mergers is that they are contrary to the
goal of the Common Market.' 68 The goal of the Common Market is a
single, unified market, however, vertical mergers lock-up suppliers
and producers to operate on in selected geographic markets, thus
preventing them from operating for the good of the entire Common
Market. 6 9 To limit the exclusivity of vertical mergers, the
Competition Commission allows producers and distributors to accept
unsolicited offers outside the territorial restriction in the merger
agreement, but they cannot actively advertise in the outside
territories. 170
C. CONGLOMERATE MERGER REVIEW

A conglomerate merger may contain both horizontal and vertical
concerns while remaining classified as a conglomerate merger.' 7 The
definition of affected markets on Form CO (the application filed with
the Competition Commission by the proposed merged companies)
only differentiates between horizontal and vertical mergers.' The
Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, however, only exempts
conglomerate mergers under the de minimus rule having an
aggregate market share of less than five percent.I73
Conglomerate mergers, do not combine competitors or companies

legal trademark is not an abuse of dominant position, even if the effect is to
prevent competition).
168. See Commission of the European Communities, First Report on
Competition Policy 1971, 2 EEC Competition L. Rep. (MB) 1407, point 45 (1972)
(discussing how exclusive vertical agreements create obstacles to complete market
integration).
169. See id. (indicating that a condition of non-exclusive contracts for approval
would be in the best interests of the Common Market).
170. See FAULL & NIKPAY, supra note 130, at 435 (explaining the reasons for
allowing passive-but not active-sales outside of territorial exclusive
agreements).
171. See Form CO, supra note 127, § 6 (defining horizontal and vertical
mergers).
172. See id.
173. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (providing a safe harbor de
minimus rule, exempting conglomerate mergers that affect less than five percent of
the market share).
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providing complimentary services.' 74 Therefore, conglomerate
mergers only pose anti-competition concerns through the horizontal
or vertical aspects of the merger.'
Conglomerate mergers are
helpful to companies interested in diversifying and reducing their
risk in case of an economic downturn. '16

III. COMPETITION COMMISSION'S REVIEW OF
THE AOL/TIME WARNER MERGER
The European Commission on Competition handled its two largest
merger applications in 2000 with the Sprint/MCI WorldCom'" and
AOL/Time Warner mergers. 78 The size and complexity of the
AOL/Time Warner merger pushed the Merger Task Force to resolve
extremely complicated issues within a short time.' 79 The Competition
Commission's review focused on three major issues, the broadband
174. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (providing definitions for
horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers).
175. See Edmund H. Mantell, PotentialAntitrust Obstacles to a Merger and the
Role of the Economist, 97 CoM. L.J. 123, 131 (1992) (discussing that although
conglomerate mergers generally pose no immediate anti-competition concerns,
they can be perceived as a threat to competition under certain circumstances which
bear resemblance to those of horizontal or vertical mergers).
176. See Blumensaadt, supra note 21, at 294 (explaining that mergers are often
driven by economic factors, including "economy of scale" and "'economy of
scope," both of which enable a company to make more efficient use of resources
such as advertising, research and development, and customer service, making the
company comparable to a "dominant competitor").
177. See Neil Buckley, Brussels Launches Full-Scale Probe into MCI-Sprint
Deal, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2000, at 1 (announcing that the Competition
Commission would conduct a four-month review of the merger, and that the
merger would proceed to the second stage, an occurrence in only one in ten
mergers reviewed by the Competition Commission).
178. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (stating that the value of the two
mergers were the largest mergers ever announced in terms of deal value); see also
Michael E. Kanell, MCI Paying S115 Billion to Complete a Powerhouse,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 6, 1999, at 1D (stating that Sprint/MCl \WorldCom
merger turned out to be the largest corporate takeover to date, as the bidding war
between MCI WorldCom and BellSouth augmented).
179. Compare infra notes 175-211 and accompanying text (discussing the
complexity of the AOL/Time Warner merger), with infra notes 24345 and
accompanying text (discussing the strict time limits imposed on the Competition
Commission in which to make approval decisions).
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Internet Service Provider ("ISP") market, the online music catalogue,
and the online music player industry.' Ultimately, the Competition
Commission decided that a merged AOL/Time Warner threatened
neither competition within the broadband ISP market due to a lack of
infrastructure, nor the online music player industry due to a lack of
market shares.' 8 ' The Competition Commission did, however, Find
that AOL/Time Warner could dominate the online music catalogue
industry and it required structural changes and procedural guarantees
prior to granting merger approval. I"
A. OVERVIEW OF THE MERGED AOL/TIME WARNER

The announcement of the AOL/Time Warner merger shocked the
world and created fear in their competitors.'83 AOL/Time Warner, if
approved, would be, by far, the largest media company in the
world.'84 Almost immediately, people raised concerns about the
ability of AOL Time Warner to act in an anti-competitive manner, as
the combined company would dwarf its nearest competitor.' - AOL,
with more than twenty-seven million customers, is the largest ISP in
the world.'86 Time Warner, with nearly thirteen million cable
180. See infra notes 176-96 (discussing major issues in the AOL/Time Warner
merger addressed by the Competition Commission).
181. See infra notes 198-213 and accompanying text (stating reasons for finding
that the AOL/Time Warner merger did not threaten competition in the broadband
ISP market, nor the online music player industry).
182. See infra note 213 and accompanying text (explaining the condition imposed
by the Competition Commission that AOL terminate all ties with Bertelsmann AG
before approval of the AOL/Time Warner merger).
183. See, e.g., Alec Klein, FTC Likelv to OK AOL Deal, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. II,
2000, at CI (indicating that opponents fear that approval of the merger will restrict
competition and consumer choice).
184. See David Schwab, Rewriting the Media Universe - Proposed Merger of
AOL and Time Warner Heralds New Orderfor the New Century, STAR LEDGEI ,
Jan. 11, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 4250728 (stating that the combined AOL
Time Warner would be the largest company in the world if approved).
185. See Peter Morton, Dose of Reality hits AOL Takeover: Share Plunge
Carves $16B off Agreement: Euphoria Evaporates as Regulatory and Accounting
Concerns Stuface, NAT. POST, Jan. 12, 2000, at CI, available at 2000 WL
5360227 (announcing that several legislators had concerns over the breadth and
depth of the merger, which could minimize competition and consumer choice).
186. See

America

Online,

t
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customers, is one of the largest fiber optic, broadband cable
providers in the world."8 7
Each company owns the crown jewel of its respective industry.
AOL controls the home page, or welcome screen, that customers see
when they sign onto its service.' Not only does the home page
allow AOL to advertise to twenty-seven million customers, but it
also provides AOL users with an entire community of information,
and provides AOL the ability to sell space within its community to

retailers interested in advertising to millions of potential
customers.189 The greater the quantity of community information
AOL controls, the less likely that users would need to go outside
AOL's community to retrieve information.'
By keeping users
within its community, AOL receives revenue from items and
information users purchase.19'
http://www.aoltimewarner.com/about/companiesamericaonline.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2001) (providing a brief description of the company and its products and
services).
187. See
Time
Warner
Cable,
at
http://www.aoltimewarner.com/about/companies/twcable.html (last visited Feb.
23, 2001) (providing a brief description of the company and its products and
services).
188. See America Online, supra note 186 (discussing its easy to use design,
including its welcome screen that allows users to access all the other services and
web pages within the AOL community). But see Alec Klein, FCC Approves AOLTime
Warner
Merger,
Jan.
12,
2001,
available
at
http://www.washtech.com/news/merger/6574- I.html (announcing the details of the
conditions imposed by the FCC regarding control of the welcome screen). One of
the conditions the FCC imposed on AOL/Time Warner was to allow competing
Internet Service Providers to have control over the welcome screen. 1i.
189. See, e.g., Shape of Things to Come?, J. REC., Sept. 27, 2000, available at
2000 WL 14298661 (indicating that Volvo advertised its new S60 sedan on AOL's
welcome screen rather than on television).
190. See Saul Hansell, Now, AOL Ever3where, N.Y. TiNIES, July 4, 1999, at I
(indicating that Internet users spend nearly forty-percent of their online time using
AOL-owned services). This is almost ten times greater than its nearest rival,
Microsoft, at almost four and a half percent. Id.
191. This concept is similar to owning a shopping mall and all the stores inside.
Imagine that whenever a consumer decides to go shopping, he or she automatically
starts in the mall. The greater number of stores in the mall providing everything
consumers want, the less likely consumers will be to leave the mall. If they never
leave the mall, buying all their necessities there the mall owner realizes high
revenues.
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Time Warner, on the other hand, owns various media and

entertainment establishments. Time Warner's assets include major
cable television programs," print media] 93 music labels," 4 and Road
Runner, an ISP." 5 Most importantly, Time Warner owns Time
Warner Cable systems, through which Time Warner provides
broadband services, including Road Runner. 96
Many experts believe that cable modems will be the dominant

method of Internet access in the future. 197 Currently, consumers
primarily access the Internet through dial-up phone modems." '
Cable modems offer the advantage of being able to transmit data at
rates one hundred times faster than phone modems. 9 9 Although cable

192. See Public Interest Statement from AOL/Time Warner to FCC (Feb. II,
2000) [hereinafter Public Interest Statement] (on file with author) (listing among
others, HBO (Home Box Office), CNN (Cable News Network), and TNT (Turner
Network Television)).
193. See id. (listing, among others, Sports Illustrated, Time, Time Life, and
People).
194. See id. (listing, among others, Atlantic, Elektra, Warner Music Group, and
Warner Bros. Records).
195. See Company Profile, at http://www.roadrunner.com/rdrun/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2001) (promoting itself as the "pre-eminent broadband service provider"
of cable modem access for residential and commercial customers).
196. See Time Warner Cable, supra note 187 (describing the number of new
broadband subscribers and the amount of upgrading done to provide additional
broadband support for more customers).
197. See Deborah A. Lathen, Broadband Today 593 PLI/Pat 491, 507 (2000)
(discussing the growing demand for cable broadband access and the estimates that
cable broadband access will increase from about two million to seventy-eight
million within the next seven years).
198. See Michael Bartlett, Online Census Shows DSL Rising, Free ISPs Ialling.
NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, Feb. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2815017
(reporting that paid dial-up Internet Service Providers account for approximately
two-thirds of all Internet access accounts). Out of almost sixty-nine million people
on the Internet, forty-six million use paid dial-up access, fifteen million use free
dial-up (making all dial-up service almost eighty-nine percent of all Internet
access), four million use cable modems, two million use DSL, and one million use
Internet TV. Id.
199. See Daniel Shih, Comment, Open Access or Forced Access: Should the
FCCImpose Open Access on Cable-BasedInternet Service Providers?,52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 793, 795 (2000) (discussing how dial-up Internet Service Providers cannot
compete with cable modems because cable modems can transfer digital
information over 1,000 times faster with cable modems than with dial-up
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modem Internet access costs nearly double the rates for dial-up, the

disparity between access speeds is attracting large numbers of
consumers to purchase cable modem access. 20
It is these cable modems, and the existing broadband networks of
Time Warner that attracted AOL. 2°' AOL realized that the future of
Internet access is broadband, that building its own cable lines would
take too long, and the costs would be prohibitively high. " Thus, the
ultimate goal of AOL's merger with Time Warner is to provide its
community content to users over Time Warner's broadband service,
thereby ensuring a sizable market share. 03

B. CONCERNS OF THE COMPETITION COMMISSION WITH THE
MERGED AOL/TIME WARNER

When the Competition Commission decided to conduct a Phase II
investigation into the AOL/Time Warner merger, its first cited
concern was over the potential domination over Internet access in
Europe.21 The Competition Commission pointed out that AOL is the
only ISP with a presence throughout most of Europe. 20 5 Neither AOL
nor Time Warner, however, has a broadband infrastructure in place
modems).

200. See Rick Overton, Broadband or Bust, PC WORLD ONLINE 110, May 1,
2000, available at 2000 WL 8856179 (discussing how the price of broadband
Internet access has dropped in recent years, yet customers are waiting a few weeks
to have their cable company install the system in their homes, due to technical
complication of installment).
201. See generally Public Interest Statement, supra note 192 (discussing the
future plans of AOL's products over Time Warner's cable systems).
202. See id. at 15 (inferring that AOL's realization about the future of internet as
broadband was reflected in its joint statement with Time Warner that both
companies believed that time and risk involved in individual pursuit would be too
high).
203. See id. at 10 (describing AOL/Time Warner's goal of being the preeminent
interactive, multimedia company).
204. See Press Release, European Commission on Competition, Commission
Opens Full Investigation into AOL/Time Warner Merger (June 19, 2000),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc= IP/00/6341
OIAGED&lg=EN (announcing the institution of a Phase I1investigation into the
proposed merger and the grounds for the full investigation).
205. See id.
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within the EU. 20 6 The Competition Commission therefore concluded
that AOL/Time Warner could not dominate the broadband Internet
access market in Europe.20 7
The Competition Commission's major concern, however, was
whether the merged AOL/Time Warner would become a
"gatekeeper" in the emerging online music industry. 12 18 The online
music industry comprises two parts: the music players and the music
catalogues. 20 9 AOL developed its own music player, Winamp,

through its subsidiary Nullsoft, which can play various types of'
online music formats.210 In addition, Winamp plays streaming audio
music, which allows broadcasts of radio stations over the Internet.2 '
Winamp uses a proprietary system, while competitors 22 use nonproprietary systems. 213 Although Winamp has a minority position in
206. See Press Release, Commission gives Conditional Approval to AOL/Time
Warner Merger, supra note 10 (discussing that a reason behind the Commission's
approval of the AOL/Time Warner was that neither company had broadband
infrastructure within the EU).
207. See id.
208. See Press Release, Commission Opens Full Investigation into AOL/Time
Warner Merger, supra note 204 (indicating the Competition Commission's
concern of AOL Time Warner dominating the emerging online music player
market).
209. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Napster Reaches Out for Lifelines as it Awaits
Judgment, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS (San Jose), Feb. 10, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 12168535 (describing the online music industry and how AOL is
considering launching its own pay-for-music service in the wake of Napstcr's
success).
210. See
What
File
Formats
does
Winanip
Support?,
at
http://www.winamp.com/download/faq/index.jhtml? filenumber=20&language-en
glish&layout=normal&prevlayout=normal (last visited Feb. 22, 2001) (indicating
that many input plug-ins are available to make Winamp support various formats).
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., Real Network's Realplayer, at http://www.realplayer.con (last
visited Sept. 28, 2001);
Microsoft's Windows Media
Player, at
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/en/software/playerv7.asp (last
visited
Sept.
28,
2001);
MusicMatch's
Jukebox,
at
http://www.musicmatch.com/info/features/index.htm?os=pc (last visited Sept. 28,
2001) (providing examples of other online music players).
213. See Press Release, Commission Gives Conditional Approval to AOL/Time
Warner Merger, supra note 10 (discussing the concern over the use of a proprietary
system to prevent other music players from playing music coded for the Winamp
system).
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the market, the Competition Commission had concerns over
AOL/Time Warner's ability to make Winamp the dominant market
mover.2 14 In addition to the online music player, the Competition
Commission also had concerns over AOL/Time Warner's online
music catalogue.
In a separate transaction outside the AOL/Time Warner merger,
AOL executed a promotion and distribution agreement with
Bertelsmann AG, the leading European music label. 1' The
combination of Bertelsmann and Time Warner's music labels would
give AOL/Time Warner approximately a thirty-three percent market
- . Although this market
share in music publishing rights in the EU. i(
share would constitute a minority, the absence of a dominant record
label would leave the market highly fractured and susceptible to even
a minority position, which the Competition Commission believed
could establish market dominance. 17 In addition to the fears of

AOL/Time Warner controlling the online music catalogues, the
ability of AOL/Time Warner to encode all of Time Warner and
Bertelsmann AG's music to only play on Winamp magnified the
concern of anti-competitive behavior.2 - 11 This encoding would create
dominant position for AOL/Time Warner and erect barriers within
214. See id. (indicating that the combination of a huge record catalogue and a
proprietary player would allow AOL/Time Warner to dominate the online music
market and dictate the terms and conditions for the use of audio files); see also Ben
Charny, AOL: Online Music's Next King?. ZDNet Ne\%s (Dec. 5, 2000), at
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2661457,00.html (discussing that
although Winamp reaches only fourteen percent of computer users while
RealPlayer reaches sixty four percent, Winamp has the ability to o\ertake
RealPlayer and become the dominant online music player).
215. See Press Release, Commission Gives Conditional Approval to AOLTime
Warner Merger, supra note 10 (stating that one of the conditions for merger
approval is AOL severing all structural links with Bertelsmann).
216. See id. (discussing the ramifications on the European music market if Time
Warner and Bertelsmann's music libraries consolidate).
217. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text (describing how, in a
market without any companies holding a large market share, a minority market
share can be dominant and have anti-competitive abilities).
218. See Press Release, Commission gives Conditional Approval to AOLTime
Warner Merger, supra note 10 (showing that there was no way of preventing
AOL/Time Warner from dominating the online music player industry and
imposing Winamp as the dominant music player, if the Competition Commission
approved the merger as proposed).
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the emerging market, forcing competitors to deal with AOL/Time
Warner to access their expansive music library.2 ' Therefore, the

Competition Commission approved the AOL/Time Warner merger,
provided AOL/Time Warner terminated all joint agreements with
Bertelsmann AG. 220 The severance of ties between AOL and
Bertelsmann AG alleviated fears of AOL/Time Warner dominating
the online music catalogue industry.

IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPETITION
COMMISSION'S REVIEW PROCESS
The Competition Commission's review process is good, but not
perfect. In analyzing the review of the AOL/Time Warner merger,
the Competition Commission committed a critical mistake in failing

to consider the future market activities of a merged AOL/Time
Warner. Specifically, the convergence of new and old media and
technology companies requires the Competition Commission to

analyze mergers more diligently to prevent merged companies from
dominating emerging markets. 22' Additionally, there are problems

ingrained within the procedures and standards that establish and
guide the Competition Commission.222 Some of these structural
problems presented themselves in the AOL/Time Warner merger.22 '
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE AOL/TIME WARNER MERGER
Whether

the

Competition

Commission

reached

the

proper

219. See supra notes 90-123 and accompanying text (explaining what
constitutes a dominant position and anti-competitive behavior within a market).
220. See Press Release, Commission Gives Conditional Approval to AOL/Time
Warner Merger, supra note 10 (indicating that AOL/Time Warner will phase out
all current agreements with Bertelsmann and agrees that until such time, the
companies will transact business at arm's length). The Competition Commission
further conditioned its approval of the merger by requiring Bertelsmann's music
from formatting Winamp in a manner that would allow it to only work on
Winamp. Id.
221. See Blumensaadt, sup-a note 22, at 306 (stating that new markets will be
significantly impacted by mergers of converging companies).
222. See infra notes 250-264 and accompanying text (analyzing the structural
and procedural problems of the Competition Commission).
223. See infifa notes 224-249 and accompanying text (analyzing the problems in
the Competition Commission's review of the AOL/Time Warner merger).
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conclusion by approving the AOL/Time Warner merger is beyond
the scope of this Comment. 224 This Comment focuses on the
problems with the Competition Commission's review process. The
greatest problem with the Competition Commission's review of the
AOL/Time Warner merger was its failure to analyze the future

impact of the merger on the multimedia markets.
1. AOL/Time Warner's Future Vision
AOL/Time Warner plans to revolutionize the marketing and
distribution of its multimedia content through broadband access. --5
Many of the forms of multimedia entertainment and interactive
services that AOL/Time Warner expects to provide are still in their
nascent stages.22 6 Time Warner's content provides AOL with very
attractive opportunities to utilize the content in an exclusive online
manner.227 The ultimate goal of the merger, however, is to combine
Time Warner's content and broadband connections with AOL's

Internet customer base, which desires quality media. 22' AOL has
already begun to provide multimedia content to users who connect
229
through high-speed Internet connections.

224. See, e.g., Joseph P. Reid, Note, Content and Broadbandand Service... Oh
My! Will a United AOL-Tine Warner Become the Wicked Witch of the Web, or
Pave a Yellow Brick Road, 26 J. LEGIS. 377 (2000) (analyzing the potential effects
of a merged AOL/Time Warner on the competitive markets and concluding that
the merger should be rejected).
225. See Public Interest Statement, supra note 192. at 11 (discussing how the
merged companies will create new forms of digital multimedia and provide access
to the content over broadband cable lines).
226. See id. at 14-15 (discussing the potential for next generation products and
services and their ability to deliver these benefits to the marketplace more quickly
as a merged entity).
227. See id. at 4-5 (listing well known Time Warner entities including WTBS
Superstation, TNT, Cartoon Network, CNN News Group, Home Box Office, Time,
People, Sports Illustrated, Warner Books, Time Life, Warner Music Group,
Atlantic, Elektra, Rhino, Sire, Warner Bros. Records, Warner Music International,
New Line Cinema, and the WB Network).
228. See id. at 13 (indicating that the merger between new and traditional media
will maximize a renowned source of journalistic talent, technology and expertise,
providing customers with significant benefits).
229. See AOL Plus FAQs, What is AOL Plus?, available at
http://free.ad.com/adplus/faq.html (last visited Oct. 8. 2001) (describing the
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2. The Competition Conmission's Current Standard

The Competition Commission Commissioner Mario Monti has
often said, "the competition rules governing the Old Economy will
apply equally to the New Economy."""' Unfortunately,
Commissioner Monti is trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.
Instead of forcing the new economy to adhere to the current
regulations based on an old economy, the Competition Commission
needs to recognize the need for flexibility of regulation, since the
new economy's technological innovations and methods of thinking
are different than the old economy ever thought possible.23 '
3. The Competition Commission Failedto Consider the Future
Market Activity of Online, Interactive Multimedia
One of the aspects of dominance the Competition Commission
should have considered is future market activity. 32 The concerns
over the Time Warner/EMI merger centered on future market
activity of online music content. 23" A merged AOL/Time
Warner/EMI would control a large music catalogue and could
dominate the emerging industry. 234 The Competition Commission
was heavily concerned with the potential merger of Time Warner
advanced services and content provided to AOL subscribers who connect to
AOL's Internet service with a high speed connection).
230. Mueller, supra note 60, at 35.
231.

See David S. Evans, Antitrust and the New EcononlY, SF 63 A.L.l.-A.B.A.

41, 49-53 (Sept. 14, 2000) (arguing that old economy rules do not apply to new
economy industries); see also David Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of
Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BUtLI

801. 857 (1998) (stating that "despite the confidence displayed by agency lawyers
and economists, we do not believe the agencies are at present well equipped to deal
with competition policy in high technologies industries.").
232. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing how future market
activity is taken into consideration to determine dominance).
233. See infi-a notes 236-237 and accompanying text (blocking the proposed
merger over fears that a combined AOL/Time Warner/EMl would control a large
enough share of music records to dominate online music).
234. See id. (warning that the integrated company could dominate the online
distribution market and music players). See also discussion stpra notes 208-13 and
accompanying text (discussing the promotion and distribution agreement with
Bertelsmann AG, an additional music catalogue, that would be part of the merged
company).
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with EMI Group because of the potential for AOL/Time Warner-2 to
dominate the delivery of music via the Internet.236 The overwhelming
concern caused Time Warner and EMI Group to abandon the
proposed merger. 237 The emerging online music industry, however, is
only one aspect of future online multimedia. -38
AOL and Time Warner acknowledged that converging these
media platforms would put them at the forefront of the technological
revolution. 23 9 The merger would give AOL/Time Warner an
opportunity to exploit their market share of several media platforms
with exclusive access to online content. For example, live streaming
2
video of CNN, 240 a sneak preview of the latest Natalie Merchant '
album, the online trailer to the Harry Potter movie,24 or the latest

235. See Molly S. Boast, Report From the Bureau oJ Competition, 1251

PLI/CoRP. 567,584 (2001) (indicating that the result of the merger would be AOL
acquiring both Time Warner and EMI Group).
236. See Press Release, Commission Opens Full Investigation into Time
Warner/EMI
Merger,
June
14.
2000,
at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc= IP/00/6 171
OIRAPID&lg=EN (discussing the concerns that prompted the Competition
Commission to institute a full inquiry into the proposed merger).
237. See John Tagliabue, Time Warner and EM1 Halt Venture Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2000, at Cl (announcing that the companies cancelled the proposed
merger). It was believed that Time Warner abandoned the merger in order to allay
the Competition Commission's concerns and allow for passage of the AOL/Time
Warner merger. Id.
238. See Public Interest Statement, supra note 192, at 13 (outlining additional
opportunities for growth in media forms, such as entertainment, publishing, news,
online services, and film distribution).
239. See id. at 14 (discussing the amalgamation of previously independent
media sources).
240. See
CNN.com
Multimedcia
Showcase,
at
http://www.cnn.comlinteractive/#av (last visited Oct. 7, 2001) (making available
audio and video control).
241. See Elektra Artists, at http://www.elektra.com/home-frame.asp (last visited
Sept. 4, 2001) (listing the artists under contract with Elektra).
242. See
Harry
Potter
Movie,
at
http://www.warnerbros.com/pages/link/extemal.jsp?url=http%3a%2f/2 fharrypott
er.warnerbros.com%2f%23&frompage=movies (last visited Sept. 4. 2001)
(indicating that Warner Bros., a division of Time Warner, produced the Harry
Potter movie).
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could all be made available only to

Unfortunately, the Competition Commission never seriously
considered the potential of AOL/Time Warner dominating these
2 44
other forms of multimedia content.
In the summer of 2000, AOL/Time Warner took its first large step
in making interactive multimedia a reality.245 If the beginning
product is an example of what the future holds, the failure of the
Competition Commission to further investigate the convergence of
multimedia content is troublesome for AOL/Time Warner's
competitors. 24 The online content and links heavily favor Time
Warner content.2 47 Similar to when Time Warner blocked Disney's
ABC television stations last year,248 competitors fear that AOL/Time
Warner will prevent customers from accessing competitors web
sites.

2 49

243. See People.com Home, at http://people.ad.com/people/index.htnil (last
visited Oct. 7, 2001) (providing online excerpts of cover stories and exclusive
online features).
244. See Press Release, Commission Gives Conditional Approval to AOL/Time
Warner Merger, supra note 10 (discussing how the Competition Commission
never addressed concerns involving these other forms of multimedia content).
245. See Jared Sandberg, AOL Rolls Out Interactive TV with Time Warner
Links; Rivals Complain of Bias, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2000, at B 1 (announcing that
AOL unveiled its first interactive unit for public use), see also George Avalos,
AOL Time Warner Merger Marks Convergence of TV, Computer, KNIGIIT- RIDDI'R
TRIB. Bus. NiEws, Jan. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2838769 (reviewing
AOLTV, the first interactive appliance that converges a television and computer,
giving users the ability to access interactive products and multimedia content).
246. See Sandberg, supra note 245 (indicating that almost all of the initial
content on the interactive site is owned by either AOL or Time Warner).
247. See id. (stating that the online service provides links to Entertainment
Weekly magazine, CNN's web site for current news, CNN/Si's web site for sports
news, and a link to program your VCR to record a movie on TBS, with all content
sites under Time Warner ownership).
248. See Jim Cooper, Fadingto Black (Time Warner Dropped the Signal of Walt
Disney-Owned Stations), BRANDWEEK, May 8, 2000, available at 2000 WL

13262371 (discussing how Time Warner dropped ABC television stations during
sweeps week because of a contract dispute).
249. See Alvalos, supra note 245 (pointing out that almost all of the links from
AOLTV is to Time Warner content). AOL counters that the reason why Time
Warner has most of the content links is that Time Warner was the first company to
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B. PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPETITION COMMISSION'S RULES,
GUIDELINES, AND PROCESS

The EU member states severely limited and precisely defined the
powers of the Competition Commission, largely because the merger

regulations

granting

the

Competition

Commission

exclusive

jurisdiction were a product of compromise among the states. This
limited power causes problems with the rules, guidelines and

processes that govern the Competition Commission's review of
merger applications.

1. Lack ofEffective Oversight Power
As a result of the compromise between the Competition
Commission and EU member states, the Competition Commission

did not receive enough power to oversee all mergers. 2 At a time
when the Competition Commission needs more power to ensure a

consistent policy, there has been a recent proposal to decentralize
power to enable the Competition Commission to concentrate further
on policy and handle only the most prestigious merger cases.25'

Under such a policy, local competition authorities would handle
more merger reviews, thereby reducing the number of notifications
that the Competition Commission would handle. 5" - Decentralization
of power and the elimination of prior approvals, however, could
result in, "greater unpredictability, inconsistent rulings, duplicative

proceedings, and varying results.

2 53

Further, problems with the

sign an agreement with AOLTV. Id.
250. See supra notes 127, 133-135 and accompanying text (describing the
threshold and minimum requirements to trigger European Union review).
251. See White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85
and 86 of the EC Treaty, 1999 O.J. (C 132) 1, at 15 [hereinafter White Paper]
(proposing that EU member states handle more merger review cases); see also
Henriette Tielemans, Chares Lister, & Theodore Voorhees, Jr., A Changed System:
Proposed Reform of European Commission Review has Foreseeable Problems,
LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2000, at 42 (describing how the proposed changes could

have a negative effect upon the operation of the Competition Commission).
252. See Tielemans, et al., supra note 251, at 42 (stating that enforcement would
be decentralized and national authorities would handle more matters).
253. See id. (discussing negative implications of decentralizing the Competition
Commission's current power).
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proposed changes could arise, because several EU countries have
inexperienced competition review procedures and staff, which could
ultimately lead to forum shopping among EU member states.s"'
2. Time Limits are Too Narrowfor Effective Review
One strictly defined rule of the Competition Commission is the
time limits imposed to conduct preliminary and in-depth reviews. 2
The time limits ensure that the Competition Commission makes
decisions timely and efficiently, providing as little disruption to the
proposed undertaking as possible. 2 6 It is estimated, however, that

increased workload might prevent the Competition Commission
from adequately reviewing and testing proposed concessions by the
undertakings.257 Rather than focusing on achieving a correct solution,
the Competition Commission is forced to negotiate hasty settlements
or block mergers instead of making informed decisions.
3. Inability to take Post-Decision CorrectiveAction
Another problem with the review process is the lack of specific
facts upon which the Competition Commission makes decisions."'
Proposed mergers must accept the Competition Commission's
conclusions without any proof.259 The lack of required proof is
brought about by the ineffective judicial review of Competition

254. See id. (commenting that a disparity in the experience of national agencies
could encourage forum shopping).
255. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text (describing the one month
time limit for preliminary investigations and four month time limit for Phase II
investigations).
256. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (indicating that the
Competition Commission has a narrow time period to make a decision).
257. See Burke et al., supra note 156, at 286-87 (estimating that changes will
result in an increased workload of nearly twenty-five percent, causing members of
the Merger Task Force to become increasingly cautious and not as agreeable to
accepting practical solutions).
258. See Mueller, supra note 60, at 35 (indicating that the Competition
Commission makes decisions with "sparse" factual basis).
259. See id. (explaining that the Competition Commission's Statement of
Objections is accepted without proof and the burden falls upon the parties to prove
otherwise).
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Commission decisions.26 ° It takes two years for a company to appeal
a decision rejecting a merger, thus making it unfavorable for
companies to challenge the Competition Commission. -' Supposing
the Competition Commission approves the merger at the end of the
two-year review period, market and company conditions may have
changed significantly, thus altering the character of the original
deal.262
The Competition Commission's power to oversee and enforce
compliance after approval is also limited in scope and effectiveness.
The inability of the Competition Commission to act after the merger
is approved, such as through divestiture, forces it to lengthen the
review process. 263 This lack of post-approval review motivates the
Competition Commission to overreact, making deeper concessions
than necessary, in order to perform its duties."M The front loading of
action, combined with the absence of a requirement that the
Competition Commission support its conclusions with solid proof,
and the deficient judicial review of decisions, makes the Commission
susceptible to abuse.
4. The Competition Commission is Viewed as Biased
Since the European Commission is largely responsible for most
economic policies in the European Union, actions of the Competition

260. See id. (opining that judicial review is not a real solution to providing an
external check on the Competition Commission's decisions). The reason for this
lack of effective judicial review is that it takes two years for a case to work its way
through the system, thus tying up the business and operations of the undertakings
for too long of a period of time. Id.
261. See id. (explaining that the amount of time it takes to appeal a Competition
Commission decision eliminates judicial review as an effective option).
262. See Burke et al., supra note 156, at 286-87 (estimating increased workloads
as a result of changes to the Competition Commission, which may serve to
increase complications that are inherent in a quickly changing market).
263. See Mueller, supra note 60, at 35 (stating that since post-merger approval
investigations are more difficult, and divestiture after merger approval is
prohibited, the Commission exhibits little or no post approval scrutiny). The
Commission's limited ability to scrutinize mergers after approval results in a timeconsuming pre-merger review process. Id.
264. See id. (indicating that the EC is reluctant to react during the review
process until emerging markets develop, due to a lack of post-approval review).
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Commission are seen as enforcing policy instead of law.26 5 The
notion of the Competition Commission exerting protectionist policies

to favor European based companies became a real concern in
connection with the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger.

66

Many

believed that the Competition Commission's actions were a direct
attempt to protect Airbus, a European company, from the American
firns.2 67 Even if the Competition Commission did not base its
decision upon a desire to protect Airbus, the ability of the
Competition Commission to interpolate economic and political
policies in merger decisions is a serious problem in need of
correction. 68
5. The Competition Commission Fails to Recognize an EJjiciencies
Defense
The Competition Commission's concern for companies is evident
in that the purpose of the Merger Task Force is to prevent harm to

competition. 69 In other countries, such as the United States, the

265. See Kauper, Merger Control, supra note 123, at 335 (discussing the
possibility that the Competition Commission's decisions are based upon trade
policy and not the merger guidelines established).
266. See Commission Decision 97/816/EC, 1997 O.J. (L336) 16 [hereinafter,
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Decision] (declaring that the Competition
Commission approved the merger contingent upon concessions granted by Boeing
and McDonnell Douglas); see also Mueller, supra note 60, at 35 (quoting an Oct.
5, 2000 letter from Senators DeWine and Kohl to the European Commission,
stating their concern that European decisions might be influenced by "panEuropean protectionism rather than by sound competition policy.").
267. See, e.g., Harry First, The Intersection of Trade and Antitrust Remedies, 12
ANTITRUST 16, 18-19 (1997) (quoting President Clinton's criticism of Competition
Commission's actions); Interview with Thomas L. Boeder & Benjamin S. Sharp.
Attorneys for Boeing, 12 ANTITRUST 5 (1997) (discussing the concern the
Competition Commission had regarding Airbus); Michael L. Weiner, Conflict and
Cooperation:Meeting the Challenge of Increasing Globalization, 12 ANTITRUST 4
(1997) (discussing Boeing's concern about the Competition Commission's
protectionist actions).
268. See Kauper, Merger Control, supra note 123, at 318-19 (discussing the
potential problems of the European Commission utilizing Competition
Commission decisions as a vehicle for policy pronouncements).
269. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32, art. 2(3) ("[a] concentration which
creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective
competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a
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purpose of antitrust review is to prevent harm to the consumers.7 0
While the United States recognizes that efficiencies can benefit
consumers through reduced prices and higher quality goods, the
European Union does not.271 In fact, because efficiencies almost
always result from the creation or strengthening of a dominant
position, it is possible that efficiencies are per se incompatible with
the Common Market.272 Accordingly, a failure to recognize
efficiencies harms consumers by preventing mergers with proconsumer benefits, while protecting European corporations in the
27 3
name of competition.
6. Lack of Independent Analysis
A final concern regarding the review process is its reliance upon
testimony and concerns expressed by the proposed undertakings
competitors.27 4 Competitors will act in their own self interest,
substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the Common Market").
270. Compare Merger Regulations, supra note 32. art. 2(3) with Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, supra note 19 (stating that "'[t]he unifying theme of the
Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance market
power or to facilitate its exercise."). The Horizontal Merger Guidelines further
state that "[m]arket power to a seller is the ability profitably to maintain prices
above competitive levels for a significant period of time."). Id.
271. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 19, § 4 - Efficiencies,
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelineshoriz-book!4.html
(discussing the benefits efficiencies provide to consumers). But see Thomas L.
Greaney, Not for Import: Why the EU Should Not Adopt the American Efficienci
Defense for Analyzing Mergers and Joint Ventures, 44 ST. Louis U.L.J. 871, 884889 (2000) (arguing that it is impossible to properly define what constitutes an
efficiency and therefore an efficiency defense only leads to protracted litigation
and incompatible agency decisions).
272. See Kauper, Merger Control, supra note 123, at 321-22 (commenting that
regardless of how the term "dominant position" is defined, the Merger Regulations
appear to preclude efficiencies).
273. See id. (noting that the United States measures the potential harm of a
merger by predicting output and price effects felt by consumers, whereas the
Competition Commission is primarily concerned with the ability of competitors to
compete).
274. See Commission Decision 96/204/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 66) 17 (indicating that
the Competition Commission can and does give weight to competitors opinions on
the potential competitive effects if the proposed merger is allowed); see also
Thomas E. Kauper, The Problem of Market Definition Under EC Competition
Law, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1682, 1732-33 (1997) [hereinafter Kauper, The

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[17:131

objecting to a larger, better financed competitor or to settle an old
grudge.2 75 This reliance on competitors data within the market is
probably a result of the insufficient time allocated for independent
fact-finding and analysis in which to evaluate merger petitions.27 '
This is dangerous because the process becomes the proverbial fox
guarding the chicken coop.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE
COMPETITION COMMISSION'S MERGER REVIEW
PROCESS
Even though the Competition Commission is unable to cure the
specific problems with the AOL/Time Warner merger because it is
prevented from taking post-merger corrective action,277 there are
several changes it can make to ensure that the process operates
correctly in the future. These changes can be broken down into rules
governing the structure of the Competition Commission 78 and the
rules governing the review process of the Competition
Commission. 79

Problem] (commenting that it is common for the Competition Commission to
solicit information about market definitions and shares from competitors).
Throughout the entire merger process, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas objected to the
views, statistics, and input the Competition Commission solicited from Airbus. See
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 266 (indicating that the
Competition Commission relied upon market share statistics provided by Airbus).
275. See Kauper, The Problem, supra note 274, at 1733 (indicating that reliance
on competitors' input is dangerous to the review process).
276. See id. (citing the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger as an example of the
Competition Commission's dependence on interested party's data in making a
decision).
277. See discussion supra Part IV. A and accompanying text (detailing tile
problems of the Competition Commission's review of the AOL/Time Warner
merger).
278. See discussion infra Part V. A (proposing changes to improve the structure
of the Competition Commission).
279. See discussion infra Part V. B (recommending changes to improve the rules
governing the review process used by the Competition Commission).
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A. IMPROVING THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMPETITION
COMMISSION

1. Increase the Central Power of the Competition Commission
The ability of the Competition Commission to institute a uniform
competition policy throughout the European Union requires greater
central control.280 More centralized power will allow for a more
uniform policy, expedited service and review, and greater
efficiency. 281 Decentralization of power removes the advantage of
one-stop shopping 2 2 and makes future competition decisions prone
to inconsistent decisions.8 3 Although the number of merger
applications is growing, the Competition Commission should be
capable of handling the increasing volume, or it should hire more
employees. 28 Alternatively, in order to maintain a consistent
competition policy, the European Commission should allow
European countries to handle more mergers, but apply the laws of the

280. See White Paper, supra note 251. at 15 (proposing changes to the
Competition Commission that would shift power from the Competition
Commission to individual member-states' antitrust regulators); see also Tielemans,
et al., supra note 251, at 42 (arguing that decentralization of power might impede
the goal of market integration).
281. But see Howard W. Fogt Jr. & Melinda F. Levitt, Will Proposed Rejbrn of
EU Rules Undermine Antitrust Enforcement?. LEGAL TIMES, May 15, 2000, at 41
(stating that the work of the Competition Commission has slowed significantly as a
result of handling large numbers of required but unnecessary notices).
282. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (commenting that the merger
regulations provide the Competition Commission with sole authority to review
certain mergers with a Community dimension).
283. See Tielemans, et al., supra note 251. at 42 (expressing concern that
different countries might apply different analyses to the same issues, thus yielding
conflicting results); see also Fogt, et al., supra note 281, at 41 (opining that some
national court systems may not have the resources or ability to handle competition
cases). There is additional concern that decentralization of power might lead to
forum shopping by companies looking for favorable precedents and rights. id.
284. See Kauper, Merger Control, supra note 123, at 312 (indicating that the
Competition Commission reviews a substantially smaller number of mergers than
its American counterparts). The Competition Commission also received fewer
notifications of proposed mergers in eight years than American antitrust officials
received in six months. Id. at 316.
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Commission.285 Such a solution
the

role

of the

Competition

would actually

Commission

while

decentralizing power, allowing the Competition Commission to
focus on policy
jurisdictions. 8 6

while

leaving

minor

mergers

to

national

2. Remove the Strict Time Limitsfor Merger Review
The expedited time limit imposed on the Competition Commission

actually causes more harm than good. 287 Although there are
exceptions to the time limits,288 the extended time is minimal and
only affects the preliminary investigation stage.28 9 Instead of

establishing a time limit, the Competition Commission should set a
hybrid system of proposal limits followed by a time limit. Under

such a system, the undertakings will be allowed to submit a
maximum of three written proposals in response to Competition
Commission concerns. 290 This will grant undertakings the time
needed to fully respond to objections of the Competition

285. See Rebecca Schoenfeldt, Comment, Competition Laws of the European
Union in the Face of the New Single Currency Market, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
715, 738-39 (2000) (proposing expanding the Merger Regulations to apply in
European national courts).
286. See id. (allowing the Competition Commission to establish the guidelines
that national courts will apply to mergers). But see Tielemans, et al., supra note
251, at 42 (arguing that while decentralization of power is problematic, allowing
national courts to apply European Community competition law is not the answer
because exemptions are not legal standards, but community interest considerations,
and therefore could vary from each jurisdiction).
287. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (describing the four week
limit for the preliminary investigation followed by a four month time limit for a
Phase II investigation, after which, the Competition Commission must either block
or accept the proposed merger).
288. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32, art. 10(1) (allowing a two week
extension of the four week preliminary investigation under certain limited
circumstances).
289. See id., art. 10 (providing time limits for initiating proceedings, making
decisions, and exemptions for exceptional circumstances).
290. See Michael Barnert, EU Merger Control. 13 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 4 (2000)
(explaining that the Competition Commission is under strict statutory guidelines of
when it can accept proposals from the undertakings).
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Commission without time restraints.29 ' To prevent the Competition

Commission from dragging its feet in the review process, it will have
one month from receipt of each written proposal, to either accept the

proposal or submit a written statement of objections.2 ' 2
3. Increase the Competition Commission s Post-Merger
Enforcement Powers

To effectively regulate and enforce its decisions, the Competition
Commission needs the ability to investigate and, if necessary,
sanction companies in violation of competition laws. Unfortunately,
the Competition Commission currently does not have that power. 2 3
This lack of review causes the Competition Commission to make
overly aggressive decisions during the merger review process. 2' Post
merger review ability would prevent the Competition Commission
from having to speculate too much about future market activity and
allow it to correct mistakes and shortcomings.29 ' The ability to seek

291. See id. A major frustration of the Competition Commission is that
companies often do not submit their best proposals until later in the review
process, hoping to gain acceptance with the least amount of concessions. But see
Kauper, Merger Control, supra note 123, at 318-19 (presenting the opposing
viewpoint that the Competition Commission may utilize final decisions in the
review process as vehicles for furthering policy goals). Although the undertakings
will be under no time restriction from the Competition Commission, they will have
internal pressure to reach a settlement as soon as possible in order to allow the
companies to get back to managing the business.
292. Cf Barnert, supra note 290, at 6 (stating that the last day the Competition
Commission currently accepts proposals from undertakings is three months into a
Phase II investigation, allowing one month to review the proposal and make a
decision). Since the Competition Commission is now able to make a decision on
proposals in a month, there is no reason to doubt that it could reach decisions in a
month in the future. The failure by the Competition Commission to either object in
writing or block the merger (only after the final written proposal by the
undertakings) in the month period will result in the approval of the proposed
merger. See id. at 7 (indicating that a merger shall receive approval if the
Competition Commission fails to block the merger at the end of the four months).
293. See supra notes 263-264 and accompanying text (discussing how the lack
of post merger enforcement ability leads the Competition Commission to take
action prematurely based upon flimsy data).
294. See id. (discussing how the lack of post-approval review motivates the
Competition Commission to act aggressively).
295. See id. (explaining that the inability of the Competition Commission to
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divestiture after the fact also reinforces the notion that merger
approval is not a permit to violate competition laws.296
Another enforcement power that the European Union should grant
to the Competition Commission is a treble damages remedy, as used
in the United States. 297 The ability to sue companies for treble
damages is compelling motivation for companies to not violate the
competition laws. 98
3. IMPROVING THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS EMPLOYED BY TI!E
COMPETITION COMMISSION

From the time the Competition Commission receives notice of a
proposed merger,299 until it renders a decision, 00 the Competition
Committee can make improvements to ensure that the process is
consistent and fair.
1. Institute an Independent, Objective Review Process
A starting point would
Commission's reliance upon
Competition Commission to
prevents competitor bias from

be to eliminate the Competition
competitors' input."" Requiring the
evaluate the market independently
corrupting the process."" Further the

seek divestiture after approving a merger weakens it and "creates an incentive [for
the Competition Commission] to act prophylactically.").
296. See id. (discussing how post merger approval powers will prevent
companies from acting with utter disregard to competition laws).
297. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15A (1994) (allowing for a recovery of an
amount equal to three times the damages suffered).
298. See Fogt, et al., supra note 281 (indicating that treble damages would help
promote compliance, but such an idea would not likely be accepted in the
European Union).
299. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32, art. 4(I) (stating that any merger
with a Community dimension must file notice with the Competition Commission
within one week of reaching an agreement).
300. See id. at art. 10 (establishing the time period in which the Competition
Commission must reach a decision).
301. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (describing how tile
Competition Commission relied on Airbus* input and statistics in the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger).
302. See Kauper, Merger Control, supra note 123, at 338 (discussing how
competitor input in a merger unfairly disadvantages the merging parties). Judge
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public sees the process as fair, accusations of protectionism will not
taint the decisions. In order to ensure fairness, the Competition
Commission must act independent of the European Commission,
which formulates economic policy. 3 Removing the Competition
Commission from direct control by the European Commission allows
it to operate as an independent entity, free from meddling.""
2. Provide Effective, Efficient Judicial Review

There is a great need to provide effective judicial review of
Competition Commission decisions. Although the ECJ has the power
to review the decisions of the Competition Commission, it has rarely
done so.3 05 This is a result of undertakings not appealing decisions
because of the length of time required to resolve an appeal.' The
European Commission should make judicial review of Competition
Commission decisions easily attainable, thus providing a check
against an abuse of discretion.' 07
Additionally, providing a legitimate and accessible judicial review
process will require the Competition Commission to provide support
for its decisions. Currently, the Competition Commission makes
Posner has said that a complaint by a competitor is the strongest argument that a
proposed merger increases competition. Id. Additionally, competitors can also
stand to gain from decreased competition, thus making any input from them
suspicious. Id.
303. See id. at 318 (indicating that in the United States, the FTC and the DOJ's
Antitrust Division are viewed as non-political because the FTC acts independently
of the Executive Branch). Additionally, the Supreme Court declared that the sole
purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent anti-competitive behavior, and therefore
requires the DOJ to prevent any economic policy from affecting its decisions. Id.
304. See id. (explaining the importance of having the Competition Commission
act as an independent body). Thus, making the Competition Commission
independent of the European Commission would render its operational procedures
equivalent to those of the FTC, and free the Competition Commission from the
suspicion that policy considerations dictate agency decisions. Id.
305. See id. at 316 (stating that -[u]ntil mid-1998, when the ECJ decided the
Kali + Salz case, the [Competition] Commission had formulated its approach to
mergers virtually without judicial involvement.") (footnote omitted).
306. See Mueller, supra note 60 (explaining that it takes about two years for
judicial review of decisions and therefore appeal is not a viable option).
307. See id. (proposing that quick and thorough judicial review will create a
superior and fairer system).
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decisions using little to no factual records or substantiation."°8 This is
due to the lack of judicial review and the inability to structure posteffective merger remedies. 309 This is not to say that the Competition
Commission should not use future predictions when evaluating
mergers. The primary goal of the Competition Commission is to
protect competition within the Common Market."" Preventing
mergers that harm competition is preferable to breaking up harmful
mergers after approval. Requiring factual proof before blocking a
merger improves competition by ensuring that helpful mergers are
not blocked, and it allows for a solid basis of precedent to ensure
stability.3"!
3. Allow an Efficiencies Defensefor Horizontal Mergers
Along with the need to recognize that new technologies need new
rules, the Competition Commission must realize the potential
advantages of horizontal mergers. The prevailing attitude is that most
horizontal mergers are anti-competitive in nature because they
remove a competitor from the market.312 Acquisitions of competitors,
though, can lead to efficiency, cheaper costs, and lower overhead.'"1
This efficiency leads to lower prices for consumers of products and
services.31 4 Efficiencies also spur research and development, which
308. See id. (discussing how the procedures allow the Competition Commission
to "act on a sparse factual record").
309. See id. (explaining that the Competition Commission acts proactively due
to an inability to act reactively).
310. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 30, art. 3(f) (stating its objective
of creating "a system ensuring that competition in the [common] market is not
distorted").
311. See Kauper, Merger Control, supra note 123, at 312-13 (explaining that
future predictions must be understandable and thorough to make future decisions
predictable).
312. See, e.g., Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 266 (stating
that removing a competitor lessens competition and creates a larger risk of
collective dominance by the remaining competitors).
313. See Robert M. Vernail, Note, One Step Forward. One Step Back: [low the
Pass-On Requirenlentfor Efficiencies Benefits in FTC v. Staples Undermines the
Revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Efficiencies Section, 7 GEo.
MASON L. REV. 133, 134 (2000) (detailing the efficiencies benefits gained from

horizontal mergers).
314. See id.
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in turn, spurs innovation. 315 Although the Merger Regulations
provide for a protection of "technical and economic progress,"3 ' it
has yet to give a basis for approving a merger. Requiring that the
technical and economic progress not create a barrier to competition
prevents an efficiency defense because efficiency creates a dominant
position, which the Competition Commission views as a barrier to
competition." 7 The European Community needs to recognize an
efficiencies defense to mergers, especially in light of the rapid
technological revolution and the innovation and advances it brings
with it.3" By not recognizing the advantages of an efficiencies
defense, the European Community may lag behind the rest of the
world in rapid technological transformation.
C. THE COMPETITION COMMISSION SHOULD ADAPT ITS RULES TO
RESPOND TO THE NEw ECONOMY

The time has come for the Competition Commission to review and
update its view on the competitive nature of mergers. The great
technological revolution is blurring the line between horizontal and
vertical mergers.319 The Competition Commission needs to realize
20
that the new economy needs new rules. The old rules do not apply
315. See id. at 135 (explaining how efficiencies allow a pooling of resources,
including knowledge and capital, thus expediting time commitments required to
develop new technologies).
316. See Merger Regulations, supra note 32, art. 2(l)(b) (allowing the merger as
long as it is to the benefit of the consumer and is not a barrier to competition).
317. See Kauper, Merger Control, supra note 123, at 354-55 (explaining that,
whereas an efficiency "form[s] an obstacle to competition," it follows that an
efficiencies defense is per se a violation of the Merger Regulations).
318. See id. (providing an explanation as to why an efficiencies defense is
beneficial to technology). But see Greany, supra note 271, at 893 (arguing that the
adoption of an efficiencies defense in the European Union will create greater
confusion and uncertainty due to an inability to establish clear guidelines of what
constitutes an efficiency).
319. See supra notes 238-239 and accompanying text (examining how
convergence of mediums and methods of delivery are distorting the difference
between competitors and suppliers).
320. See Maurits Dolmans, Restrictions on Innovation: An EU Antitrust
Approach, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 455, 465 (discussing how regulations stifle
innovation and produce results opposite those desired); see also Mueller, supra
note 60, at 35 (examining how behavioral remedies, instead of promoting long-
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Instead of looking at technological mergers in terms of what these
companies currently do, the Competition Commission should
consider what the companies propose to do in the future. 2 ' This
approach also evaluates new or emerging ideas, such as interactive
multimedia content, which is the future of AOL/Time Warner. 2
Taken separately, AOL and Time Warner acted more on vertical than
horizontal planes.3 23 The convergence of their products, however,
3
and their future plans, in reality reflects horizontal concerns. 11
Consider another example of why old rules do not apply to new
technologies. If AOL/Time Warner acquired a telephone company,
the Competition Commission, under the current merger guidelines,
would not have competition concerns since AOL/Time Warner is not
involved in providing telephone services. 32 5 New technologies,
however, are beginning to transmit voice transmissions over highspeed, broadband connections. 2 6 In the future, broadband cables are
term competition, actually harm innovation and reduces competition).
321. See supra notes 232-249 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
future market activities in dominance evaluation). Although the Competition
Commission considered the future market activity of online music players, it failed
to consider the potential of AOL/Time Warner to dominate interactive, multimedia
products in the future. Id.
322. See supra notes 238-244 and accompanying text (describing the next
generation products and services AOL Time Warner will offer customers).
323. See Seth Schiesel & David Leonhardt, Justice Dept. Moves to Block
Merger of Two Phone Giants, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at A I (discussing how
the AOL/Time Warner merger has few horizontal concerns, unlike the Sprint/MCI
WorldCom merger, which was blocked due to horizontal concerns).
324. See, e.g., Press Release, Commission Opens Full Investigation into Time
Warner/EMI Merger, supra note 236 (discussing the concern over the proposed
merger of Time Warner and EMI in that the combined company (AOL Time
Warner and EMI) could dominate the online music player industry). Although
neither EMI nor Time Warner have music players, the Competition Commission
had a valid concern due to the potential of the converged products. Id.
325. See Public Interest Statement, supra note 192 (listing all of the services
AOL and Time Warner provide, which do not include telephone services).
326. See Ilene Knable Gotts, Antitrust Review of Telecommunications hndustry
Mergers, 14 ANTITRUST 58, 58-59 (2000) (detailing the different possible methods
of transmitting voice communications that are - or will be - alternatives to landline
services currently in use). The ability to transmit voice data over broadband can be
done through fiber optics owned by utility companies. M. See also Scan Parham,
Voice Over B-oadband: Expanding Network Capabilities, RURAL TELECOMMS.,
Jan. 1, 2001 (explaining that broadband technologies have developed to allow
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likely to carry cable television, telephone, video conferencing,
Internet, closed circuit television, interactive video games, and radio
signals. 7 The failure of the Competition Commission to adapt its
rules to new technology will either fail to protect competition or
stifle innovation.

CONCLUSION
The Competition Commission is a very young antitrust
organization that is still learning from its mistakes.3 2 At a time when

it should be growing stronger, the Competition Commission faces the
potential of decentralizing its power.3 -9 This would be a mistake of
epic proportions, threatening competition rules in the European
Union. Instead of giving up on the Competition Commission,
reforms can streamline the process, create greater efficiency, and
provide new guidelines to properly evaluate new economy

companies.
The year 2000 provided the Competition Commission with its two

largest merger reviews. 330 Unfortunately, the antitrust review of the
AOL/Time Warner merger illuminated problems within the
Competition Commission. Some of these problems were specific to
voice data transmissions over the network, including carrying multiple phone lines
over one broadband connection); Martin J. Moylan, Telecommunications Firm
Buys 2-year-old Massachusetts Conpany, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS,
Sept. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 26754475 (quoting a report by Cahners InStat Group predicting cable phone subscribers will multiply from less than one
million in 1999 to over twenty million in 2004).
327. See Deborah A. Lathen, Broadband Today (PLI ed. 2000), at 507
(examining the future potential for broadband): see also Telephone Interview with
David M. Webster, Lead Multi-Product Technician, Cablevision Systems Corp.
(Mar. 1, 2001) (discussing new and emerging technologies being developed for
future implementation on broadband cable systems).
328. See Schoenfeldt, supra note 285, at 727 (explaining that the Competition
Commission evolved from the Treaty of Rome and has only been in charge of
preventing the creation of dominant concentrations since 1990, when the European
Commission passed the Merger Regulations).
329. See White Paper, supra note 251, at 24 (proposing giving national courts
greater jurisdiction to review merger applications).
330. See Press Release, Commission Gives Conditional Approval to AOL'Time
Warner Merger, supra note 10 (providing the Competition Commission's review
of the AOL/Time Warner merger).
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the merger, others were a result of the structure and process
employed. With the right changes and guidance, the Competition
Commission can learn from its mistakes. A company's future may
just depend on it.

